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Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty
and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration
S.I. Strong*
ABSTRACT
International commercial arbitration has long been considered one of the paradigmatic forms of
private international law and has achieved a degree of legitimacy that is virtually unparalleled in
the international realm. However, significant questions have recently begun to arise about the
device’s public international attributes, stemming largely from a circuit split regarding the nature
of the New York Convention, the leading treaty in the field, and Chapter 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, which helps give effect to the Convention in the United States.
Efforts have been made to place the debate about the New York Convention within the context
of post-Medellin jurisprudence concerning self-executing treaties. However, that framework
does not adequately address the difficult constitutional question as to what course should be
adopted when a particular issue is governed by both a treaty and a statute that is meant to
incorporate that treaty into domestic law.
This Article addresses that question by considering the role of and relationship between the New
York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, and by providing a robust analysis of the
constitutional, statutory and public international issues that arise in cases involving international
treaties and incorporative statues. Although the discussion is rooted in the context of
international commercial arbitration, the Article provides important theoretical and practical
insights that are equally applicable in other types of public international law.
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According to the U.S. Constitution, treaties entered into by the United States constitute “the
supreme Law of the Land” and are binding on all state and federal courts.1 The U.S. Supreme
Court has similarly recognized the supremacy of international treaties and the role of the courts

* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); J.D., Duke
University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The
author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a solicitor in England
and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center
for the Study of Dispute Resolution.
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U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; see also id. art. III, §2, cl. 1.
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in enforcing those instruments, stating that “[i]nternational law . . . is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice” of this country.2
As straightforward as these principles may seem, they have nevertheless generated a
considerable amount of controversy over the years, both as a matter of international and
constitutional law.3 However, there is often little overlap between constitutional and
international analyses,4 and courts and commentators typically avoid the “difficult constitutional
question” as to what course should be adopted when a particular issue is governed by both a
treaty and a statute that is meant to incorporate that treaty into domestic law.5 Although a
number of interpretive devices exist to help courts deal with these issues,6 these mechanisms
only go so far and are often more popular in theory than in practice.7

2

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
See John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 657-58
(2010) (“There have been spirited debates as to the precise domestic legal status of properly ratified
treaties, the scope of the power of the federal courts to construe ambiguous statutes in a manner consistent
with international law, the correctness of the Supreme Court’s practice of relying on international sources
when interpreting the Constitution, and the extent to which customary international law has the status of
federal common law.”).
4
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J.
1762, 1764 (2009) (noting authorities have seldom considered “the force of international law as a matter
of the constitutional law of the United States”). Furthermore, ”[f]ew international law scholars are also
serious U.S. constitutional scholars.” Id.
5
Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732-33 (5th Cir.
2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety
Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010);
Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541,
547-50 (2008) [hereinafter Bradley, Intent]; Coyle, supra note 3, at 657-58, 660-61.
6
These mechanisms range from the Charming Betsy canon to the last-in-time rule. See Curtis A.
Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 91
[hereinafter Bradley, Judicial Power]; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality,
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 161 [hereinafter Bradley, Duality]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:
Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 990, 1099-1105 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-108 (1994) (listing various interpretive canons used in U.S. courts); Alex
Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When it is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
1243, 1307-23 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S.
Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 76-105 (2012); David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against
Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2270-78 (2010)
[hereinafter Moore, Duality]; John T. Parry, Congress, The Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of
3
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Furthermore, some areas of law remain outside standard jurisprudential analyses. For
example, international commercial arbitration has been largely overlooked by scholars in both
constitutional and public international law,8 although a recent circuit split regarding the
relationship between the leading treaty on international commercial arbitration (the 1958 United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more
commonly known as the New York Convention)9 and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA))10 has generated a spate of commentary in the area of insurance disputes.11
The absence of any detailed analysis of the constitutional and public international
attributes of international commercial arbitration is somewhat strange, given the ever-increasing
amount of international trade in the world and arbitration’s status as the preferred means of
resolving cross-border commercial disputes.12 However, this omission is perhaps reflective of
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1209, 1209 (2009); Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations
Law to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J. 445, 479
(2012).
7
See Roger P. Alford, The Internationalization of Legal Relations, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 146,
147 (2002) [hereinafter Alford, Internationalization]; Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1646-47 (2011).
8
See Ronald G. Goss, Can State Laws Prevent International Arbitration of Insurance Disputes Under the
New York Convention? 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 93 (Nov. 2010-Jan. 2011) (noting “[t]here are . . . a host of
treaty interpretations doctrines . . . that have never been addressed by a court” in the context of
international commercial arbitration, including “the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the Charming Betsy
Canon, and the Last-in-Time Rule”).
9
See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 92 (2009).
10
See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012).
11
See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2012); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp.
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La.
Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65
(2010); Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000); Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.
12
See BORN, supra note 9, at 68; see also Christopher A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation
Relationship in Transnational Dispute Resolution: Empirical Insights From the U.S. Federal Courts, 2
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 39, 43-52 (2008) [hereinafter Whytock, Relationship]; Christopher A.
Whytock, Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance: The Case of Transnational Commercial
Arbitration, 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 6-8 (2010) [hereinafter Whytock, Private-Public]. The number of cases
filed in U.S. courts and relating to international commercial arbitration has risen exponentially in recent
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several larger problems relating to the perception of international commercial arbitration in the
legal community at large.
First, international commercial arbitration is often considered in the same light as
consumer, employment and labor arbitration, even though international proceedings are much
more sophisticated than domestic forms of arbitration and reflect little of the informality
commonly associated with other types of arbitral proceedings.13 This lack of understanding
about the nature of international commercial arbitration could lead some non-specialists to
conclude that the field is not worthy of serious scholarly scrutiny.14
Second, international commercial arbitration is often characterized primarily, if not
exclusively, as a form of private international law.15 While it is certainly true that the device is
used to resolve disputes between private actors (including states behaving as private actors16),
international commercial arbitration also constitutes a form of public international law,17 as
illustrated by the central role played by the New York Convention and other international treaties

years, with commentators suggesting that as many as 1,800 matters are heard per year. See S.I. Strong,
Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Borders]; see also Whytock, Relationship, supra, at 5867, 75-79.
13
See BORN, supra note 9, at 1746; S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 4-5 (2012) [hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE], available at http://www.fjc.gov.
14
See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 122-24 (2009) [hereinafter Strong, Sources].
15
See Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of States and Private International Law Treaties: A Model for
Accommodating Globalization, 73 MO. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2008).
16
See 28 U.S.C. §1605 (2012); S.I. Strong, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Foreign States or
State Agencies, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 336-38 (2006) [hereinafter Strong, FSIA].
17
See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶205, 247-300 (1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN]; W.
Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 5-6 (2010); Leon E. Trakman, “Legal Traditions”
and International Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 26 (2006); Christopher A.
Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 449, 465-75 (2008).
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in the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.18 In fact, with over 145 states parties,
the New York Convention is one of the most successful commercial treaties in the world, which
suggests it is both impossible as well as inappropriate to ignore the public international attributes
of international commercial arbitration.19 Indeed, there currently appears to be a resurgence of
interest in international commercial arbitration qua public international law.20
Third, international commercial arbitration is often framed as a practical rather than a
doctrinal discipline, a phenomenon that appears to be closely tied to the fact that arbitral awards
do not create formal precedent.21 However, courts can become involved in arbitral disputes in a

18

See New York Convention, supra note 9; David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial
Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 685, 704 (2012); see also Organization of American States, Inter-American
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (Montevideo
Convention), May 14, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention];
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr 21, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 364; BORN,
supra note 9, at 91-109. These other treaties are regional in nature, and the United States is a state party
to one, the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, supra. Chapter 3 of the FAA describes the
relationship between the Panama Convention and domestic U.S. law. See id.; 9 U.S.C. §§301-07 (2012).
Although there are a number of important differences between the Panama and New York Conventions,
Congress has indicated that the two are to be construed in a similar manner. See House Report No. 501,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678; DRC, Inc. v. Republic of
Honduras, 774 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011); Employers Ins. of Wasau v. Banco Seguros Del Estado,
34 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1120 (E.D. Wis.), aff’d, 199 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999); BORN, supra note 9, at 104;
John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and its Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 1-2, 19-20 (2000). Therefore, this Article will focus solely on the New York
Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 9.
19
See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: 1958 Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_ status.html (last visited Jan. 3,
2012) [hereinafter New York Convention Status]; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; BORN,
supra note 9, at 91-105; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 17, ¶¶190-192, 247-300.
20
See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L. J. 775, 778-81, 864-67
(2012) [hereinafter Born, Adjudication]; Alex Mills, Rediscovering the Public Dimension of Private
International Law, 24 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 2011, 13, 20-21; S.I. Strong, Monism and Dualism in
International Commercial Arbitration: Overcoming Barriers to Consistent Application of Principles of
Public International Law, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MONISM & DUALISM
__ (Marko Novaković ed., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Monism and Dualism]; Whytock,
Private-Public, supra note 12, at 1-2.
21
See Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 477, 501-09 (2008) [hereinafter Young, Supranational]. However, some types of soft precedent do
exist. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? 23 ARB. INT’L
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variety of ways and, as a result, produce binding precedent relating to arbitration.22 Furthermore,
the international arbitral community encourages the publication of arbitral awards in denatured
(redacted) form, thus allowing scholars and practitioners to engage in increasingly sophisticated
studies of arbitral as well as judicial behavior.23 Together, these sources support a diverse range
of doctrinal analyses. Although the field remains somewhat under-theorized,24 one area that has
received an increasing amount of interest involves the intersection between arbitration and
constitutional law.25
Much of the existing constitutional analysis relates to domestic arbitration, which creates
an unfortunate lacuna in the international realm. While there have been several recent attempts
to rationalize the U.S. approach to international commercial arbitration, including the American
Law Institute’s development of a Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial

357, 361-78 (2007); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1909-10 (2010).
22
See BORN, supra note 9, at 418; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 37-87. But see Julian D.M. Lew,
Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 179, 180 (2006).
23
These awards appear in various yearbooks and electronic databases. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 26-27, 83-85
(2009) [hereinafter STRONG, RESEARCH]; see also infra note 353 and accompanying text.
24
See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2-3 (2010); see also
BORN, supra note 9, at 184-86; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION ¶¶5-1 to 5-33 (2003).
25
See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013); see also Gary B. Born,
Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 17-19, 21-23 (2009) [hereinafter
Born, Freedom]; Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 186, 210-14
(2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-51; Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 989-1104 (2000); Jean Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Biding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); S.I. Strong, International Arbitration and
the Republic of Colombia: Commercial, Comparative and Constitutional Concerns From a U.S.
Perspective, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47, 99-105 (2011); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding:
The Constitutional Implications for Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1745-67
(2006).
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Arbitration26 and the Federal Judicial Center’s publication of a judge’s guide on international
commercial arbitration,27 more work remains to be done. This Article therefore attempts to fill
this gap in the literature by considering international commercial arbitration from a constitutional
and public international law perspective.
Although the matters discussed herein are often of a highly theoretical nature, they also
have significant practical value given the growing number of questions regarding the relationship
between the New York Convention and the FAA.28 For example, not only has a circuit split
recently emerged regarding the application of the New York Convention to international
insurance disputes,29 but there has also been a longstanding controversy among U.S. courts
regarding form requirements (i.e., the type of writing that is necessary to reflect an arbitration
agreement) in disputes involving the Convention.30 Form requirements are an especially critical
issue in international arbitration, since they dictate whether a particular arbitral agreement or
award is governed by the New York Convention.31 Certiorari has been sought on these issues on

26

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(forthcoming) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]; George A.
Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 175, 175-99 (2009).
27
See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13. The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education arm of
the U.S. federal judiciary. See Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov.
28
See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012).
29
See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text.
30
New York Convention, supra note 9, arts. II, IV(1), V(1)(a); Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark Int’l
Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999), partially abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Group v. Oracle
Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); Sphere Drake Ins. plc v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666
(5th Cir. 1994); see also Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005); Smith/Enron
Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1999); BORN,
supra note 9, at 580-81; S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an “Agreement in Writing” in International
Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act,
48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47, 58-78 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Writing].
31
See New York Convention, supra note 9, arts. II, IV(1), V(1)(a); BORN, supra note 9, at 580-81;
Strong, Writing, supra note 30, at 58-78.
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numerous occasions,32 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s ongoing fascination with arbitration
suggests that it is only a matter of time before the Court turns its attention to the intersection
between constitutional and public international law.33
The specific issue addressed in this Article involves the “difficult constitutional question”
regarding what courts should do when faced with both a treaty and a statute designed to provide
some sort of support for the domestic application of that treaty.34 Although this inquiry
obviously triggers the debate about self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,35 the issue, as
it is presented in the arbitral context, is much more complex than mere self-execution.
Furthermore, this precise question has seldom been addressed in any context, let alone
international commercial arbitration.36
While this Article focuses on the specific language of the New York Convention and the
FAA, the discussion nevertheless provides important insights to lawyers and jurists working in a
wide variety of subject matter areas, since the analysis addresses certain theoretical concerns that

See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010) (regarding an insurance dispute); Strong, Writing, supra note 30, at
49 & n. 5 (listing six recent petitions for certiorari in the area of form requirements).
33
In the past five years, the Supreme Court has heard eight arbitration cases, with two additional cases set
for argument this Term. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Granite Rock
Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010); Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130
S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Arthur
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009);
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S.
576 (2008); Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W.
3070 (2012); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (2012).
34
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732-33 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted); Coyle,
supra note 3, at 657-58, 660-61.
35
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Moore, Duality, supra note 6, at 2229; see infra notes 79121 and accompanying text.
36
See Coyle, supra note 3, at 657-58, 660-61.
32
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have been largely ignored by both courts and commentators.37 In fact, international commercial
arbitration constitutes an ideal context in which to debate these kinds of larger issues, since the
fifty-year history of the New York Convention provides researchers with a degree of empirical
and comparative data unknown in other areas of law.38 Furthermore, arbitration has achieved a
level of legitimacy to which other types of international adjudication can only aspire, thus
providing an additional reason why this field is particularly worthy of study.39
The discussion proceeds as follows. First, section II sets the stage by putting
international commercial arbitration into a public international law context and applying standard
analytical concepts to practices that have primarily been considered as a matter of private
international law. Although this Article does not attempt to resolve the issue about whether and
to what extent the New York Convention is self-executing under U.S. law, this section provides
an overview of the current circuit split so as to provide the foundation for later discussions.40
Next, Section III considers the interpretation and implementation of the New York
Convention as a matter of both theory and practice.41 This inquiry, though arising in the context
of arbitration, should be useful even to those working in other fields, since international
commercial arbitration’s long and active history constitutes what might be called a laboratory for
statutory and treaty interpretation. This section discusses certain empirical data developed by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and includes a detailed

37

See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012).
See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also infra notes 141, 353 and accompanying text.
39
See Mark L. Movsesian, International Commercial Arbitration and International Courts, 18 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 423, 448 (2008); Young, Supranational, supra note 21, at 477.
40
See New York Convention, supra note 9.
41
See id.
38
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evaluation of the structural and conceptual challenges that can arise when a U.S. court is asked to
interpret Chapter 2 of the FAA.42
The discussion then moves to section IV and considers the New York Convention and the
FAA in light of a number of standard interpretive devices, including the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) and the Charming Betsy canon.43 This analysis also
introduces several more recently developed interpretive methodologies, including the borrowed
treaty rule and a subject-specific teleological approach, so as to determine which of the various
interpretive techniques is most appropriate in the arbitral setting.
Section V concludes the Article by bringing together the diverse strands of argument and
weighing up the various alternatives. This section also discusses how the lessons learned in the
context of international commercial arbitration might assist analysts working in other areas of
public international law.

II.

Setting the Stage

A.

International Commercial Arbitration as Public International Law

For decades, international commercial arbitration has been considered one of the world’s most
successful forms of private international law, a conclusion that appears to have led some people
to overlook arbitration’s public international attributes.44 However, “[b]oth scholars of private
international law and attorneys for the Department of State have uniformly concluded that there

42

See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08.
See New York Convention, supra note 9; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307; Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
44
See Virginia A. Greiman, The Public/Private Conundrum in International Investment Disputes:
Advancing Investor Community Partnerships, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 395, 404 (2011).
43
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is no constitutional obstacle to the regulation of private international law through treaty,”45 which
means that there is no principled reason to exclude international commercial arbitration from the
kinds of analyses that are common in other areas of public international law simply because the
New York Convention primarily addresses private rather than public law concerns.46
Indeed, to do so would be contrary to longstanding legal principles. For example, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized over a century ago that international law not only includes
questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately
called the “law of nations,” but also questions arising under what is usually called
“private international law,” or the “conflict of laws,” and concerning the rights of
persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private
or public, done within the dominions of another nation.47
Commentators have taken a similar view. For example, Philip Jessup suggested that the term
“transnational law” was preferable to “international law,” since the latter did not adequately
convey the dynamic interaction between public and private international law,48 while Harold
Koh has noted that the law of nations has long been known to “embrac[e] private as well as
public . . . transactions.”49 Therefore, it is not only appropriate but necessary to apply the
fundamental principles of public international law to international commercial arbitration.

45

Ku, supra note 15, at 1068.
See New York Convention, supra note 9.
47
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
48
PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
49
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2351 (1991)
[hereinafter Koh, Litigation]; see also Ku, supra note 15, at 1063; Zaring, supra note 18, at 704.
46
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B.

Monism, Dualism and International Commercial Arbitration

The relationship between international and domestic legal orders has been extensively discussed
as a matter of international law, constitutional law and institutional design.50 One of the most
standard analytical paradigms involves the concepts of monism and dualism.51
The basic parameters of these two principles are well-known. Monist states typically do
not distinguish between international and domestic law, and allow national courts to rely directly
on international law.52 Dualist states, on the other hand, view international and domestic law as
inherently distinct and require certain actions (typically a legislative act of implementation)
before international legal principles may be directly relied upon in national courts.53 “[M]onism
and dualism can vary with the type of obligation, meaning that a state can be monist with regard
to treaty law but dualist with regard to customary international law.”54
Monists often believe that international law is superior to domestic law, although the
question of hierarchy is somewhat distinct from the issue of whether international law can
achieve direct effect within a particular legal order.55 Matters of hierarchy and status are decided
by reference to the constitutional law of the relevant legal system.56
Although monism and dualism have traditionally played a central role in international
and constitutional legal theory, some debate nevertheless exists as to the concepts’ scope and
50

See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 710 (2006).
51
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (7th ed. 2008); Curtis A.
Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529,
530-31 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Breard]; Coyle, supra note 3, at 656 & n.1; John H. Jackson, Status
of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 311, 314-15 (1992).
52
See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 31-34; Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 530; Coyle, supra note 3, at
656 & n.1; Jackson, supra note 51, at 314-15.
53
See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 31-34; Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 530; Coyle, supra note 3, at
656 & n.1; Jackson, supra note 51, at 314-15.
54
Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 714.
55
See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 539; Jackson, supra note 51, at 312, 318.
56
See Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 713.
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continuing vitality. For example, some commentators claim that “[m]onism is dead,”57 while
other observers believe that the basic principles of monism live on, either by virtue of a practice
known as “creeping monism,” wherein common law courts rely on various international treaties
despite the absence of implementing legislation,58 or through the creation of a less extreme
version of monism.59 Other scholars take the view that it is dualism that is outdated and that the
proper analytical paradigm now involves the distinction between monism and pluralism.60
The United States stands in a somewhat peculiar position with respect to these concepts.
Because the U.S. Constitution does not indicate whether the country is monist or dualist in
nature,61 U.S. courts must rely on the judicially created concept of “self-executing treaties”62 and
“non-self-executing treaties” when deciding whether a treaty is directly applicable in the United
States.63 In many ways, the situation is not optimal, since the test relating to self-execution is

57

Alexander Somek, Monism: A Tale of the Undead, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND BEYOND 343, 344 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012).
58
See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of
Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 633 (2007).
59
See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 531; see also Armand de Mestral & Evan Fox-Decent,
Rethinking the Relationship Between International and Domestic Law, 53 MCGILL L. J. 573, 582 (2008);
Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 188
(1993) (noting increased interest in monistic approaches).
60
See Neil Walker, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, supra note 57, at 17, 17-21; see also Jackson, supra note 51, at
314.
61
See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
455, 458 (2010).
62
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008); BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 48; see also David
L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53
HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 138-39 (2012) [hereinafter Sloss, Two-Step]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 112 HARV. L. REV.
599, 667 n.308 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties].
63
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Jackson, supra note 51, at 320; de Mestral & Fox-Decent,
supra note 59, at 583, 605-06; Moore, Duality, supra note 6, at 2229; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93
VA. L. REV. 571, 578 (2007).
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somewhat convoluted64 and is made even more confusing by virtue of the fact that a treaty may
be self-executing as to some issues or for some purposes but not as to others.65 Furthermore, the
concept of self-execution does not apply to customary international law, thereby creating
significant questions about custom’s place in the United States’ constitutional order.66
Other problems also exist. For example, although international and constitutional law
scholars have considered monism and dualism for decades, virtually no one appears to have
applied these concepts to international commercial arbitration, despite the central role played by
the New York Convention in the international arbitral regime.67 Instead, most references to
monism and dualism in international commercial arbitration are made only in passing.68

64

See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-32 (2008); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d
376, 388 (4th Cir. 2012); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1985); Bradley, Intent, supra note 5, at 540; Sloss, Two-Step, supra note 62, at 135; Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter
Vázquez, Four Doctrines]; Wu, supra note 63, at 578-79.
65
See Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 469; see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment), cert.
denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).
66
Some commentators believe customary international law is subordinate to federal legislation (since
customary international law cannot be self-executing), while other experts believe customary international
law should enjoy the same status as treaties. See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 549-50; J.H.
Dalhuisen, Custom and Its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 339, 36970 (2008); Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1800-04. Hierarchically speaking, treaties (at least to the extent they
are self-executing) are considered analogous to federal law and thus superior to inconsistent state law.
See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 548; Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1774.
Because treaties hold the same status as federal law, the latter of the two instruments will prevail in cases
of unavoidable conflict. See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 549 (describing the “last-in-time” rule);
Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1776. However, a treaty that the subject of enabling legislation can also (or
perhaps can only) rely on the domestic law to establish its primacy over the laws of the individual states.
See infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
67
See New York Convention, supra note 9.
68
See LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶4-45; Amazu A. Asouzu, African States and the Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards: Some Key Issues, 15 ARB. INT’L 1, 15 (1999); Radu Bogdan Badhu, Current Status of
International Arbitration in Romania, 10 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 473, 479 (2008); Mauricio Gomm Ferreira
Dos Santos, Arbitration in Brazil, 21 J. INT’L ARB. 453, 460 (2004); Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao,
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India: Condition of Reciprocity in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND NATIONAL COURTS: THE NEVER ENDING STORY, X ICCA CONG. SER. 177, 181-82 &
n.16 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2001).
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This is not to say that there has not been extensive discussion about the extent to which
various countries comply with the principles espoused in the New York Convention, since the
commentary on that subject is both broad and deep.69 However, those analyses typically focus
on the effect that various domestic statutes, including those based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law), have on international
commercial arbitration.70 These statutes are vitally important to the proper operation of the
international arbitral regime because the New York Convention was not meant to provide a
comprehensive regulatory framework for international commercial arbitration but was instead
limited to issues relating to the enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitral agreements.71
Therefore, even those states that are monist in nature need to adopt some sort of statute to fill in
the various procedural gaps left by the New York Convention.72
Commentary in the United States tends to follow a similar path, focusing on individual
issues arising under the Convention and the FAA rather than on larger constitutional concerns.73
However, questions about the self-executing nature of the New York Convention have become

69

See New York Convention, supra note 9; BORN, supra note 9, at 1004-57, 2701-2878; FOUCHARD
GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 17, ¶¶629-34, 1666-1716; LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶15-1 to 15-57;
STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 88-137.
70
See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, 18th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), revised by Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on
Int’l Trade Law, 39th Sess., June 17-July 7, 2006, Annex I, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, U.N. GAOR, 61st
Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law]; BORN, supra note 9, at 115-21;
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 17, ¶¶153-205; LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶2-38 to 2-41.
The Model Arbitration Law was specifically designed to operate in harmony with the New York
Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 9; Model Arbitration Law, supra, Explanatory Note
to 1985 version, ¶47; BORN, supra note 9, at 115-21; William W. Park, The Specificity of International
Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1243 (2003).
71
See BORN, supra note 9, at 95-96; ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 9-10 (1981).
72
See New York Convention, supra note 9; Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International
Arbitration: The Case for Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 89-90.
73
See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012); Christopher R. Drahozal, The
New York Convention and the American Federal System, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 107-14; Strong,
Writing, supra note 30, at 52-70.
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increasingly urgent in light of a growing circuit split regarding the arbitrability of international
insurance disputes.74 Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue in 2010,
experts believe that the matter will have to be addressed at some point in the near future, given
the importance of the international insurance and reinsurance industries to the U.S. economy.75
Questions about the self-executing nature of the New York Convention also arise in other
contexts, including debates about form requirements76 and the FAA’s ability to preempt state
law.77 Although this Article does not turn on matters relating to self-execution, it is nevertheless
helpful to outline the parameters of the current debate so as to identify the problems U.S. courts
face and demonstrate how the proposals contained in this Article overcome those concerns.78

See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2012); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp.
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La.
Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. 131 S. Ct. 65
(2010); Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000); Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Inc. Co., No. 07-CV-1071, 2007
WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co.
I., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
London, No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996), appeal dismissed by
119 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n
(Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992),
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993). A flurry of commentary has arisen with respect to this
issue. See Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung and the Scope of
the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 205, 219 (2012); Goss,
supra note 8, at 93; Joshua J. Newcomer, International Decision, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 326, 326-32 (2011);
David A. Rich, Deference to the “Law of Nations:” The Intersection Between the New York Convention,
the Convention Act, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and State Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 81, 84-86 (2010); Michael J. Ritter, Disputing Arbitration Clauses in International
Insurance Agreements: Problems With the Self-Execution Framework, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. 40, 41
(2012).
75
A recent study places the United States at the top of the international insurance market. See National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2011 Premium Volume – Worldwide,
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_stats_top_50_worldwide_insurance_markets.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
2013). One of the world’s preeminent international insurers/reinsurers, Lloyd’s of London, conducts
forty-three percent of its business in the United States and Canada. See Lloyd’s of London, Global
Reach, http://www.lloyds.com/flash/global-reach/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
76
See Strong, Writing, supra note 30, at 52-70; see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
77
See RUTLEDGE, supra note 25, at 79-124; Drahozal, supra note 73, at 107-15.
78
See New York Convention, supra note 9.
74
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C.

The Debate About Whether the New York Convention is Self-Executing Under U.S. Law

At this point, judicial analyses of the self-executing nature of the New York Convention are
limited and in conflict.79 For example, while the U.S. Supreme Court recently suggested, obiter
dicta, that the Convention is self-executing,80 those statements were quite brief and have not
been relied upon by the lower courts.81
Lower federal courts have typically avoided the issue of self-execution.82 However, the
matter has become increasingly difficult to ignore, given the need to consider reverse preemption
in the context of international insurance disputes.
The term “reverse preemption” describes situations in which Congress defers to state
authority, thereby allowing state law to trump (i.e., reverse preempt) federal law.83 The phrase is
used most often in the context of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which is said to authorize reverse

79
80

See New York Convention, supra note 9.
The Court noted in the seminal case of Medellin v. Texas that
Congress is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those
involving complex commercial disputes. . . . The judgments of a number of international
tribunals enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation enacted by
Congress. See, e.g., . . . 9 U.S.C. §§201-208 (“The [U.N.] Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be
enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter,” §201). Such language
demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international
obligations when it desires such a result.

Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
520 n.15 (1974).
81
See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 722 (5th Cir.
2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).
82
See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 2012); Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises,
Inc. 426 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007); Chloe Z Fishing
Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1252-53 (S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Fotochrome,
377 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (D.C.N.Y. 1974).
83
See Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 669, 673 n.29 (2009).
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preemption of the FAA in cases where state law bars arbitration of insurance disputes.84 While
reverse preemption is uncontroversial in domestic disputes falling entirely under Chapter 1 of the
FAA, difficulties arise in international matters due to questions involving the nature of the New
York Convention and the relationship between the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA.85
At this point, the two opposing positions are most cogently described by the Second
Circuit in Stephens v. American International Insurance Co.86 and the Fifth Circuit in Safety
National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.87 Although the Third and
Fourth Circuits have also weighed in on this issue and have both concluded that the FAA and
New York Convention are not reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,88 these
opinions are less relevant to the current discussion, since the Third Circuit analysis focuses
largely on issues relating to foreign sovereign immunity89 and the Fourth Circuit ultimately
decided the dispute as a matter of statutory, rather than treaty, interpretation.90 Those district
courts that have considered the issue appear to agree that reverse preemption does not occur in
cases falling under the Convention.91

See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”); Bernstein, supra note 83,
at 673 n.29.
85
See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§201-08.
86
See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
87
See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).
88
See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2012); Suter v. Munich Reins.
Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
89
See Suter, 223 F.3d at 162.
90
See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 388; see also 15 U.S.C. §1012(b).
91
See New York Convention, supra note 9; Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Inc. Co., No. 07-CV1071, 2007 WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth
Settlement Co. I., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd’s of London, No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996), appeal
dismissed by 119 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between Engl. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n
84
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The Second Circuit was the first appellate court to discuss reverse preemption under the
New York Convention and conducted a brief and somewhat superficial analysis in Stephens that
some authorities believe was quickly called into question by another panel sitting in the same
circuit.92 The decision in Stephens turned largely on the court’s characterization of Chapter 2 of
the FAA as implementing legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention.93 As a result,
the Second Circuit concluded that the New York Convention was not self-executing and was
therefore “inapplicable” in the circumstances at bar.94
In its discussion, the court relied entirely on Foster v. Nielson for the definition of a selfexecuting treaty, stating that
[o]ur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever
it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract – when either of the parties engage to
perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a
rule for the court.95
The emphasis placed on Foster v. Nielson is entirely understandable, given that Stephens
was handed down in 1995, long before the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on selfexecuting treaties.96 However, other courts – including the Fifth Circuit – have found the
analysis in Stephens not only dated but unhelpfully terse and conclusory.97

(Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992),
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993).
92
See New York Convention, supra note 9; Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 390-91.
93
See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012); Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
313-14 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833);
94
Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45.
95
Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14, as quoted in Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45.
96
See Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491, 521-22 (2009); Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868-71 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Noriega v.
Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002-10 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 436-37 (2006); Medellin v. Drake, 544 U.S. 660, 685-90 (2005)
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When the Fifth Circuit took on the issue in 2009, it conducted a much more robust and
detailed discussion of the New York Convention, the McCarran-Ferguson Act and Chapter 2 of
the FAA.98 For example, the court not only considered the mandatory nature of the Convention,
it also noted the purpose of Chapter 2 of the FAA in giving effect to the Convention.99 In so
doing, the Fifth Circuit was guided in part by the pro-arbitration policy enunciated in both the
New York Convention and Supreme Court precedent.100 However, the Fifth Circuit also noted
that Chapter 2 of the FAA serves a variety of purposes, including the creation of federal
jurisdiction and the identification of an appropriate venue.101 These statements suggest a
recognition by the court that the New York Convention requires some sort of supplementary
legislation to address certain background procedural matters.102 Indeed, similar types of
legislation have been adopted even in monist states that do not need to use domestic enactments
to give direct effect to a treaty, suggesting that Chapter 2 of the FAA does not necessarily have
to be considered a form of implementing legislation in the traditional sense.103
The Fifth Circuit took a very interesting view of the relationship between a treaty and its
implementing legislation in U.S. law, stating that
[e]ven if the [New York] Convention required legislation to implement some or
all of its provisions in United States courts, that does not mean that Congress
intended an “Act of Congress,” as that phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that has been implemented by
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 735 (2004); Torres v. Mullin,
540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
97
See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722; id. at 737 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
98
See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-208; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); Safety Nat’l,
587 F.3d at 717.
99
See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II(1); 9 U.S.C. §201; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722,
725.
100
See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 730; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-39 (1985).
101
See 9 U.S.C. §§203-04; see Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722.
102
See New York Convention, supra note 9; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722.
103
See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08; see also supra note 72 and infra note 316 and accompanying text.
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congressional legislation. Implementing legislation that does not conflict with or
override a treaty does not replace or displace that treaty. A treaty remains an
international agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and
ratified by the Senate, not by Congress. The fact that a treaty is implemented by
Congress does not mean that it ceases to be a treaty and becomes an “Act of
Congress.”104
As a result, some authorities have characterized the opinion as indicating “that the provisions of
a non-self-executing, implemented treaty ‘have full preemptive effect’” in the United States.105
In arriving at this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that Chapter 2 of
the FAA invokes rights arising out of the Convention, which can be seen as directing the court to
the Convention itself.106 Furthermore,
[w]hen Congress amended the FAA in 1970 to include provisions that dealt with
the Convention, it provided in 9 U.S.C. §203, that “[a]n action or proceeding
falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties
of the United States.” This is a direct indication that Congress thought that for
jurisdictional purposes, an action falling under the Convention arose not only
under the laws of the United States but also under treaties of the United States.107

Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). Similar conclusions have been reached in other
contexts. See Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing
Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat. Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also
Prokopeva v. Carnival Corp., No. C-08-213, 2008 WL 4276975, at *3 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008);
Matter of Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Luxembourg) and Am. Marine
Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992), appeal dismissed, 981
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993). Some courts go even further. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies,
Inc., 969 F.3d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting “ratification of the Convention makes it part of the
supreme law of the land, as enforceable as Congressional enactments”); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of British
Columbia, No. 07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2007); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. R&S
Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 935, 938 (D. Minn. 2001); Filanto, S.p.A., v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp.
1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed by 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.1993) (though also noting a role
for the FAA).
105
See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 387 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Safety Nat’l, 587
F.3d at 733 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment)).
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See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C.
§§201-08.
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Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-32 (1920).
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These factors led a majority of the Fifth Circuit to conclude that courts are empowered under
Chapter 2 of the FAA to rely directly on the language of the New York Convention.108
Although the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the self-executing nature of the New York
Convention is quite detailed, the court did not ultimately decide the case on those grounds.109
Instead, Safety National appears to turn on the court’s conclusion that the “commonly understood
meaning of an ‘Act of Congress’ does not include a ‘treaty,’ even if the treaty required
implementing legislation,” and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act therefore does not apply in cases
falling under the Convention.110 Nevertheless, the analysis reflected in this case is quite
instructive.
In addition to the majority holding, Safety National generated both concurring and
dissenting opinions.111 The concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Clement suggested that the New
York Convention should be considered self-executing, at least with respect to Article II, which
concerns form requirements as well as the mandatory duty to compel arbitration in cases falling
under the Convention.112 In arriving at this conclusion, Circuit Judge Clement focused on the
way in which Article II(3) of the Convention speaks directly to the courts of a state party, rather
than the state party itself.113
Because the concurrence in Safety National directly addressed the issue of self-execution,
Circuit Judge Clement was forced to address problematic dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court

See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also id. at 734 (Clement, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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See New York Convention, supra note 9.
110
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 723; see also 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012).
111
See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 737 (Elrod, J.,
dissenting).
112
See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 733-34 (Clement, C.J.,
concurring the judgment).
113
See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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suggesting that the New York Convention is non-self-executing.114 Circuit Judge Clement
overcame that obstacle by concluding that the Supreme Court was referring to Article III, rather
than Article II, of the Convention.115 While this approach may have its supporters, scholars have
noted the incongruity of giving different effects to different parts of a single legal instrument.116
Safety National also included a dissenting opinion that concluded that the New York
Convention, as a non-self-executing treaty, had no place in the national legal order.117 Instead,
the three dissenting judges believed that “only the implementing legislation [i.e., Chapter 2 of the
FAA] had preemptive effect.”118 Because Chapter 2 constitutes an “act of Congress,” it falls
within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and can be reverse preempted.119
The opinions in Stephens and Safety National address a range of issues and demonstrate a
variety of perspectives concerning the relationship between the New York Convention and the
FAA.120 However, one item that is missing from both discussions as well as the associated
commentary is serious consideration of the “difficult constitutional question” that arises when a
particular issue is governed by both a treaty and a statute that is meant to incorporate that treaty
into domestic law.121 This is an area of significant practical and theoretical concern in
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international commercial arbitration (as well as in other fields) and requires clear analysis if
courts are to interpret and apply the New York Convention properly.122

III.

Interpreting Treaties Relating to International Commercial Arbitration

A.

Interpreting and Implementing the New York Convention as a Matter of Theory

Although contemporary commentary often overlooks the public international law attributes of
international commercial arbitration, several international authorities have nevertheless indicated
that the New York Convention should be interpreted “in accordance with the rules of
interpretation of international law, which are codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.”123 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides the
general rules of interpretation and indicates that
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
122

See New York Convention, supra note 9.
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION 12 (2011) [hereinafter ICCA GUIDE]; see also Vienna Convention,
supra note 43, arts. 31-32; VAN DEN BERG, supra note 71, at 3-5; Bachand, supra note 72, at 95; Toby
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4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.124
Article 32 provides supplementary rules of interpretation and indicates that
[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.125
The emphasis placed by international commentators on the Vienna Convention could
give rise to some difficulties in the United States, since the U.S. has signed but not yet ratified
that instrument.126 However, the Vienna Convention has been relied upon by several members
of the U.S. Supreme Court and various lower federal courts in contexts other than international
commercial arbitration.127 Indeed, some circuits consider the Vienna Convention “‘an
authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties,’ insofar as it reflects actual
state practices.”128 Furthermore, “[t]he Department of State considers the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties an authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”129 Therefore,
reliance on the interpretive principles outlined in the Vienna Convention would appear to be
appropriate in the United States.130
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Id. art. 32.
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Some problems could arise as a result of the Vienna Convention’s non-retroactivity
clause, since the New York Convention was opened for signature more than a decade prior to the
Vienna Convention’s opening date.131 However, the United States acceded to the New York
Convention on September 30, 1970, several months after the United States signed the Vienna
Convention, which suggests that the retroactivity clause should not apply in cases involving
international commercial arbitration.132
Ultimately, it may not matter whether the Vienna Convention formally applies to disputes
involving the New York Convention, since numerous commentators have concluded that the
interpretive approach reflected in “the Vienna Convention does not differ greatly from U.S.
practice.”133 Indeed, these similarities can be seen in at least one case involving international
commercial arbitration.134 Furthermore, the rising influence of textualism in the United States
may minimize any methodological differences that currently exist,135 since the primary
distinction between the U.S. approach and the Vienna Convention appears to be that “U.S. courts
have consulted extratextual sources a bit more readily than the convention suggests.”136
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See id. art. 4; see also New York Convention, supra note 9.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 4.
133
Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1262. Most interpretive canons used in the United States require
construction of a treaty in a manner consistent with its “text, intent, and purpose,” which many observers
believe would yield an outcome similar to that under the Vienna Convention. David J. Bederman,
Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 957 (1994); see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 43, arts. 31-32; David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose
of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 575-80 (2010).
134
See Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark Int’l Inc., 186 F.3d 210, 216-18 (2d Cir. 1999), partially
abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005).
135
At this point, Supreme Court jurisprudence appears somewhat split as to the degree to which textual
analyses prevail and the level of clarity that must be exhibited in the text of a treaty. See Abbott v.
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990, 1993-95 (2010); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-12 (2008); see also
id. at 540-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 461, 471.
136
Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1262; see also Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 461, 470-72; David Sloss,
Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002)
[hereinafter Sloss, Constitutional]. But see Jonas & Saunders, supra note 133, at 578.
132

27

B.

Interpreting and Implementing the New York Convention as a Matter of Practice

The philosophical distinction between “ought” and “is” suggests that it is not enough to identify
how the New York Convention should be construed.137 Instead, it is necessary to consider how
the Convention actually is interpreted and applied in practice.138 Such analyses are particularly
important because the Vienna Convention indicates that the parties’ subsequent agreements and
practices are to be taken into account as an interpretive tool.139 Commentators have also noted
the propriety of a “dynamic” form of interpretation in cases involving commercial treaties.140
Interestingly, international commercial arbitration stands in a somewhat privileged
position with respect to questions of subsequent practice, since a variety of public and private
institutions have been compiling data on the interpretation and application of the New York
Convention for over fifty years, thereby making comparative analysis easy for both courts and
commentators.141 The large and increasing number of arbitration-related disputes in U.S. courts
also provide useful comparative data.142
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1.

The UNCITRAL survey

One of the most useful studies in this area of law involves a survey conducted by UNCITRAL on
the implementation of the New York Convention worldwide.143 The project, which was
completed in 2008, generated responses from 108 of the then-142 states parties to the New York
Convention and found that:
[f]or a vast majority of States, the New York Convention was considered as “selfexecuting”, “directly applicable” and becoming a party to it put the Convention
and all of its obligations in action. Most of those States mentioned that, in
accordance with their Constitution, conventions “enjoy a hierarchy above laws”,
“form an integral part of domestic law and prevail over any contrary provision of
the law”, or that “they have force of law after their conclusion, ratification and
publication according to the established procedures.”144
Thus, most states appear to have adopted a monist approach to the New York
Convention.145 However, monism simply describes the way in which a legal system integrates
international law into its domestic realm as a matter of constitutional law.146 Questions still
remain as to how a particular treaty is interpreted by national courts.147
According to UNCITRAL, “[a] significant number of responses emphasized the fact that
the Convention should be interpreted according to articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, either in combination with other rules of interpretation, or as
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the sole source of interpretation.”148 However, the report also noted that “[u]pon ratifying or
acceding to the [New York] Convention, several States made a declaration that the Convention
was to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of their Constitution,” a practice that
could diminish the scope and effectiveness of the New York Convention.149
The UNCITRAL report also noted that, in addition to various constitutional canons,
states relied on judicial precedent or advice from a particular ministerial or governmental office
when interpreting the New York Convention.150 Furthermore, some states indicated that they
could or would rely on the New York Convention’s travaux préparatoires.151 Though
appropriate as a matter of constitutional law, this type of interpretive diversity is potentially
problematic in an area of law where international consistency and predictability is paramount.
Although a majority of the states surveyed by UNCITRAL appear to have adopted a
monist approach to the New York Convention, a number of states indicated that they gave
domestic effect to the Convention on a dualist basis.152 This information was unsurprising, since
commentators had long recognized the need for some states to provide for domestic application
of the New York Convention through implementing legislation.153 However, the UNCITRAL
study reinforced some of the dangers of dualism by noting that in these jurisdictions, the
Convention could be deemed to have no legal significance as a matter of national law.154
UNCITRAL also noted that various states “mentioned that distinct rules of interpretation
were used depending on the instrument to be interpreted, i.e., the Convention or the
148
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implementing legislation.”155 Furthermore, the method of incorporation varied significantly,
with some legal systems using “an ‘Arbitration Act, to which the Convention [was] attached as a
schedule,’” while other jurisdictions used “‘the enactment of a special act on Foreign Arbitral
Awards’, or the ‘enactment of a legislative decree.’”156 Still other countries amended their laws
so as to give effect to the Convention.157
The report went on to identify the types of practical problems that can arise in a dualist
legal system. For example, UNCITRAL noted that “[c]hanges of varying scope might have been
introduced in the implementing legislation.”158 These potential variations included “changes of
substance, additions, or omissions”159 as well as “only a partial adoption of the Convention.”160
UNCITRAL identified additional problems in states that allow the text of implementing
legislation to prevail over the treaty itself as a matter of constitutional law.161
Although the UNCITRAL survey focused solely on matters relating to the New York
Convention, the report provides useful empirical data for comparative constitutional lawyers,
since the information provided by the 108 state respondents confirms the ways in which
implementing legislation can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.162 Furthermore, the
UNCITRAL survey notes the diversity of interpretive methods used in treaty-related disputes, a
feature that commentators working in many areas of public international law will find
intriguing.163
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2.

The Federal Arbitration Act

Federalist legal systems such as the United States expect a number of permissible variations to
arise in the way in which certain laws are interpreted and applied in the domestic setting.164
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n our dealings with the outside world
the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the complications as
to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of political power between the national
government and the individual states.”165
The need for predictability and consistency is particularly high in cases involving
international commercial arbitration, since commercial actors around the world need to be able to
anticipate how a particular issue will be resolved by national courts.166 Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court famously stated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., that
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
parties’ [arbitration] agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.167
Indeed, “[i]f the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have
a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before
interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international agreements.”168
Specialists in international commercial arbitration have conducted a considerable amount
of research into the way in which U.S. courts interpret and apply the New York Convention, but
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most of those studies have focused on specific issues within the field.169 Thus, for example, one
line of analysis attempts to either reconcile or reject the use of manifest disregard of law as a
means of vacating an arbitral award in disputes falling under the New York Convention170 while
other research efforts focus on the interaction between the form requirements contained in the
New York Convention and those reflected in the FAA.171 Debates also rage about the extent to
which anti-suit injunctions172 and U.S. “gateway” analyses are consistent with the New York
169
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Convention.173 Circuit splits exist with respect to a number of these issues,174 and certiorari has
been sought from the Supreme Court on various occasions.175
As useful as these subject-specific discussions are, they fail to address more systemic
issues relating to the relationship between the New York Convention and the FAA.176 Those
matters, which can be framed as either textual or conceptual in nature, demonstrate a number of
concerns that arise as a matter of both international and constitutional law.

a.

Textual issues

When analyzing the relationship between the New York Convention and the FAA, the first
matter to consider involves the text of the two instruments.177 Section 201 of the FAA indicates
that “[t]he Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June
10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”178 This
statutory formulation appears to be nearly unique in U.S. law, for although other federal statutes
occasionally use the term “in accordance with this chapter” or similar language, the FAA’s
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incorporative framework is entirely different from those other examples.179 Therefore, it appears
impossible to construe this term using any interpretive canons relating to the use of the same or
similar terms in different contexts.180
Furthermore, it is unclear from the face of Section 201 whether Chapter 2 is intended to
supplement, diminish or amend the terms of the New York Convention in any way.181 On the
one hand, Section 201’s reference to other parts of Chapter 2 could simply reflect a recognition
that the New York Convention neither intends to nor in fact does address all matters relating to
international arbitration, and that states need to enact supplementary legislation to create an
adequate regulatory framework in which the Convention can operate.182 On the other hand, the
reference to other parts of Chapter 2 could suggest an intention to somehow alter the terms of the
Convention.183
Close consideration of the other aspects of the statute yield potentially contradictory
results. For example, a number of items discussed in Chapter 2 of the FAA have no analogue in
the New York Convention and therefore cannot be said to affect the interpretation or application
of the treaty in U.S. courts.184 These provisions, which relate to federal jurisdiction, venue,
removal, compelling arbitration, naming of arbitrators and confirming the award, are consistent
with the type of background procedural matters that are contained in arbitration statutes enacted
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other jurisdictions, including statutes adopted in states that reflect a monist approach to
international treaties.185
The final provision of Chapter 2 of the FAA, Section 208, also suggests that Chapter 2 is
not meant to alter the terms of the Convention.186 This section states that “Chapter 1 [of the
FAA] applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter [i.e., Chapter 2] to the extent
that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United
States.”187 While this provision may initially appear to constitute nothing more than a gap-filling
mechanism similar to that found in Sections 203 to 207 of the FAA, the express limitation
embodied in Section 208 (i.e., that the incorporation of Chapter 1 cannot be conducted in a way
that is inconsistent with the Convention) can be used to demonstrate a congressional
disinclination to alter the terms of the treaty.188
However, there is one aspect of the statute that could be read to alter the United States’
obligations under the New York Convention.189 Section 202 of the FAA discusses form
requirements, a subject that is also covered under Article II of the New York Convention, and
does so in a way that could be seen as inconsistent with the language of the Convention.190
Section 202 states that “[a]n arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the [New York]
Convention.”191 Unfortunately, section 2 (which is found in Chapter 1) of the FAA predates the
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New York Convention and therefore does not mirror the language found in the Convention.192
For example, while section 2 of the FAA only needs evidence of a “written provision” or “an
agreement in writing,” the New York Convention requires either “an arbitral clause in a contract
or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams.”193
Difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Section 202 of the FAA and
Article II of the Convention have generated a longstanding circuit split194 that is distinguishable
from the burgeoning debate about whether the New York Convention, and particularly Article II,
is self-executing as a matter of U.S. law.195 However, both situations are exacerbated by judicial
opinions suggesting that Article II of the Convention is the only section (or perhaps one of the
only sections) of the treaty that is self-executing.196
This Article will not attempt to resolve these particular issues, since they are beyond the
scope of the current discussion. However, it would appear logical to extend the admonition
contained in Section 208 (i.e., that no aspect of Chapter 1 that was inconsistent with the
Convention should be relied upon in cases falling under Chapter 2) to issues arising under
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Section 202.197 This reading would conform with the overall text of Chapter 2 as well as the
notion that Congress should not be assumed to legislate in contravention to the United States’
international obligations, absent evidence to the contrary.198

b.

Conceptual issues

Although textual analyses give rise to their own set of problems, the more striking issues arise as
a conceptual matter. Indeed, as one commentator recently noted, “[i]t is now 40 years since the
United States became a party to the [New York] Convention, and there is still an absence of
consensus on the application of the Convention” in U.S. law, at least in some regards.199
Perhaps the most significant difficulty facing U.S. courts is a widespread confusion about
the circumstances in which the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA apply.200 The
issue here involves the distinction in the Convention between “arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought” (i.e., “foreign” arbitral awards) and “arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards
in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought” (i.e., “non-domestic”
awards).201
Although most states parties to the New York Convention only recognize the
Convention’s applicability to foreign arbitral awards, Article I(1) of the Convention specifically
allows states to determine whether to extend the protections of the Convention to both foreign
197
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and non-domestic awards.202 The United States has explicitly agreed to do so pursuant to
Sections 2 and 202 of the FAA, which state that Chapter 2 of the FAA applies to agreements and
awards relating to foreign arbitrations (i.e., arbitrations that are or were seated outside of the
United States) and also to arbitrations that are or were seated within the United States and that
arise
(1) between a U.S. and foreign party;
(2) entirely between foreign parties; or
(3) entirely between U.S. citizens, but only if there is a sufficient international nexus.203
Even though these latter types of proceedings are seated within the United States, they
are considered non-domestic as a matter of U.S. law and therefore fall under the New York
Convention pursuant to the second sentence of Article I(1).204 The problem is that although the
statutory scheme is quite clear (albeit slightly convoluted), a number of U.S. courts continue to
insist erroneously “that Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . still has an independent and
decisive role to play in determining the legal effectiveness of an international award subject to
the New York Convention of 1958, if that award is rendered in the United States.”205 Not only
do these sorts of misapplications of the FAA violate federal law, they also constitute a breach of
international law.206
Issues relating to non-domestic awards and agreements are not the only type of
conceptual difficulties that can arise in international commercial arbitration. Additional
problems exist with respect to the way in which the FAA interacts with underlying principles of
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domestic law.207 The issue here involves various requirements relating to personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts.208
The first set of difficulties relates to the need for parties to establish federal jurisdiction
over either the person or the property in question by relying on either (1) the appropriate
constitutional test (such as those relating to general or specific personal jurisdiction209 or in rem
or quasi-in rem jurisdiction210) or (2) principles set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.211 However, because these requirements do not exist in the New York Convention,
they can be seen as constituting an additional, and often invisible, hurdle for parties to overcome
in cases brought in U.S. courts.212
This issue reflects a potential conflict between international and constitutional law. In
one line of cases, courts have given primacy to the constitutional tests for jurisdiction by relying
207
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on longstanding principles regarding the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over treaties213 and
on Article III of the New York Convention, which allows courts to enforce arbitral awards “in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.”214
However, the presumptive superiority of U.S. domestic law is less defensible when jurisdiction is
based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, since statutes carry the same constitutional weight
as treaties.215 In those instances, the better solution might be to give full effect to claims made
by various commentators that Article III of the Convention was never meant to constitute an
additional grounds upon which to deny enforcement of an arbitral award or agreement.216
Issues also arise with respect to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, even though Chapter 2
of the FAA establishes an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in disputes
arising under the New York Convention.217 The problem here can be traced back to the failure
of some courts to recognize the applicability of Chapter 2 of the FAA to disputes involving nondomestic agreements or awards.218 Because Chapter 1 of the FAA does not provide for federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, a court operating under the mistaken impression that Chapter 2 does
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not apply might ask the parties to establish subject-matter jurisdiction through some other means,
such as the existence of a federal question or diversity of the parties.219 Although it might appear
that it would be easy to establish the requisite facts, that is not always the case.220
Problems with either personal or subject matter jurisdiction could result in the dispute’s
being dismissed from federal court. While the matter could be reasserted in U.S. state court, that
raises the question of whether the denial of federal jurisdiction in matters relating to international
commercial arbitration constitutes a breach of international law.221 To answer that question, it is
necessary to determine whether and to what extent the New York Convention applies in U.S.
state court as a matter of both U.S. and international law.222
The New York Convention considers matters of federal-state competence in Article XI,
which states:
In the case of a federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the
legislative jurisdiction of the federal authority, the obligations of the federal
Government shall to this extent be the same as those of Contracting States which
are not federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the
legislative jurisdiction of constituent states or provinces which are not, under the
constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the
federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to
the notice of the appropriate authorities of constituent states or provinces at the
earliest possible moment;
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(c) A federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other
Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the federation and its
constituent units in regard to any particular provision of this Convention, showing
the extent to which effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other
action.223
Under this provision, the first issue to determine is whether international commercial
arbitration falls within the competence of state or federal government (or both). Under U.S. law,
such matters are clearly fall within the ambit of federal law in whole or in part, either by virtue of
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (which is broadly construed as a matter of both
constitutional and arbitral law)224 or as a result of Missouri v. Holland (which extends federal
legislative competence beyond its traditional constitutional boundaries in cases involving
treaties).225 Furthermore, “[i]n joining the Convention, the executive did not take advantage of . .
. [Article XI(b)] because it viewed arbitration as coming within federal legislative jurisdiction,
namely the Federal Arbitration Act.”226 Therefore, the U.S. federal government appears
responsible for the full and appropriate implementation of the New York Convention as a matter
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of international law, regardless of whether the individual disputes are heard in state or federal
court.227
There is no general principle of public international law that requires a dispute to be
heard in a particular forum, so long as the relevant international standards are properly
applied.228 Indeed, “[i]n the vast majority of cases, there is nothing in the treaty text, negotiating
history, or ratification record that specifies which domestic actors have the power or duty to
implement the treaty.”229 The New York Convention reflects this standard approach by simply
placing the obligation to recognize and enforce arbitral awards and agreements on the
“competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought” rather than designating
what qualities that authority should have.230 Thus, it can be said the New York Convention gives
federal or non-unitary states that fall within the ambit of Article XI(a) the discretion to decide the
means by which the Convention will be given domestic application.231
Although only a handful of cases relating to international commercial arbitration have
been heard in U.S. state courts thus far,232 commentators agree that U.S. state courts constitute a
“competent authority” within the terms of the New York Convention.233 The FAA also
contemplates the possibility that matters relating to international commercial arbitration can and
will be heard in state court, since the provisions in Chapter 2 relating to removal from state court
are permissive rather than mandatory.234 As a result, it is clear that U.S. state courts may hear
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matters arising under the New York Convention, although those courts would appear obliged to
apply and uphold the terms of the Convention pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.235
While U.S. state courts may be competent to hear matters relating to international
commercial arbitration as a matter of theory, the practical application of this principle could give
rise to a number of problems. For example, there is currently a great deal of debate regarding the
extent to which the FAA preempts state law,236 with further developments anticipated in light of
two cases that are currently pending in the U.S. Supreme Court.237 Preemption remains an issue
of concern in international matters, for although numerous authorities clearly indicate that
Chapter 2 of the FAA and the New York Convention both apply in state court,238 that approach
has not been universally adopted.239
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Another concern relates to the extent to which U.S. state courts can rely on foreign and
international law. At this point, state courts play a “major role in the implementation of . . .
treaty obligations”240 and “routinely apply international law and foreign law.”241 However, a
significant number of states have recently adopted (or attempted to adopt) state statutes or state
constitutional amendments limiting their courts’ ability to rely on anything other than U.S. state
or federal law.242 A number of these measures are quite broad and could threaten the use of
foreign and international law not only in judicial disputes relating to international commercial
arbitration243 but also in arbitral proceedings themselves.244 While most commentators believe
that these provisions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, they are nevertheless disturbing.245
Finally, U.S. courts have exhibited certain conceptual difficulties relating to the question
of whether the New York Convention or the FAA should prevail in cases of actual or potential
conflict.246 Although this could be a simple issue to resolve under the last-in-time rule,247 in that
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Chapter 2 of the FAA was enacted before after the United States’ international obligations were
formally established under the Convention,248 courts and commentators have not relied on this
sort of mechanistic analysis.

C.

Potential Solutions

The arbitral community has proposed a number of means of resolving the various practical and
jurisprudential issues that can and do arise with respect to the interpretation of the FAA and the
New York Convention.249 For example, some commentators have suggested that the best way to
address conflicts between the FAA and the New York Convention is to amend the FAA, with the
leading proposal advocating the adoption of the Model Arbitration Law in whole or in part.250
Because the Model Arbitration Law was specifically designed to operate in harmony with the
New York Convention, that approach would resolve most, if not all, tensions between national
and international law.251
Other commentators suggest amending the New York Convention,252 although this
approach has its problems.253 For example, treaty amendment can be “harder than constitutional
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amendment.”254 Furthermore, amending a treaty does not address problems generated by
dualism’s need for implementing legislation.255
However, there is a third alternative to consider, namely the adoption of an appropriate
rule of interpretation that takes into account the fact that Chapter 2 of the FAA is meant to
incorporate the New York Convention into domestic law.256 This possibility is considered in the
next section.

IV.

Interpretive Alternatives Involving the New York Convention and the FAA

A.

Incorporative Statutes – Intermediaries Between Domestic and International Law

One of the biggest problems facing U.S. courts in cases relating to international commercial
arbitration involves the interaction between the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the
FAA.257 Some courts have framed this “difficult constitutional question” as involving the
“preemptive effect (if any) non-self-executing but implemented treaty provisions have under the
Supremacy Clause.”258 Other courts have set aside the question of self-execution to focus on
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other aspects of the relationship between the New York Convention and the FAA.259 Regardless
of how the issue is characterized, it is one that requires resolution.
Post-Medellin jurisprudence suggests that courts faced with a treaty should look at the
text of the treaty, along with certain other ancillary factors, to determine what role, if any, that
treaty has in the domestic legal order.260 While this sort of detailed analysis would of course be
ideal, some courts and commentators instead use a shorthand method of analysis arising out of
Foster v. Neilson and focus on the simple idea that only non-self-executing treaties require
implementing legislation.261 Under this abbreviated interpretive approach, the mere existence of
Chapter 2 of the FAA can constitute evidence that the Convention is not self-executing.262
Therefore, the determination about the nature of a treaty, and thus the character of the
relationship between the treaty and domestic law, can sometimes turn as much on the character
of domestic legislation as it does on the character of the treaty.
One major problem with this methodological approach (beyond its potential for
circularity) is that very little judicial or scholarly attention has been paid to the question of what
constitutes implementing legislation.263 This lacuna is a somewhat surprising given the
centrality of implementing legislation to the definition of a self-executing treaty,264 although the
sheer volume and diversity of international agreements to which the United States is a party
suggests that Congress must wield a wide variety of legislative tools to integrate those various
259
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instruments and principles into the domestic legal order.265 As a result, it is helpful to consider
briefly the various ways that domestic legislation can relate to international agreements. One
interesting and useful analytical paradigm involves the concept of incorporative statutes.266

1.

Purpose of incorporative statutes

As a functional matter, incorporative statutes fulfill a variety of practical and policy-based
purposes relating to the integration of principles of international law into a domestic legal
system.267 For example, using domestic legislation to implement international law offsets
concerns that direct application of international law would lead to a democratic deficit268 or
threaten constitutional principles regarding the separation of powers.269
Use of domestic legislation can also minimize debates about whether a particular legal
system should adopt a broad (“transnationalist”) or narrow (“nationalist”) approach to
international treaties.270 Over the years, friction between nationalists and transnationalists has
become increasingly intractable, largely because it is virtually impossible to ascertain which of
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the two approaches is ultimately “correct” as a matter of law.271 Instead, the continuing
discussion about these issues reflects “deeper uncertainties” about international law as a general
concern and, as such, may not be “susceptible to technical or doctrinal solutions” alone.272
Although it is often tempting to attempt to identify and impose broad, sweeping,
universally applicable rules, the ongoing tension between nationalist and transnationalist
perspectives suggests that there may be times when it is preferable as both a practical and
jurisprudential matter to adopt what are known as “incompletely theorized agreements.”273 This
concept, as articulated by Cass Sunstein, posits that “people can often agree on constitutional
practices, and even on rights, when they cannot agree on constitutional theories.”274
Incorporative statutes can be viewed as a type of incompletely theorized agreement
because they outline certain necessary legal practices while simultaneously avoiding deeper
debates about the extent to which certain international principles automatically apply in U.S.
courts.275 Furthermore, courts asked to interpret and apply treaties that involve incorporative
statutes do not have to rely on any interpretive canons or analytical presumptions regarding the
extent to which international law can or should be incorporated into the domestic legal regime.276
Instead, the incorporative statute provides all of the necessary information about the domestically
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applicable legal principles, although in some cases the statute may refer the court back to the
treaty itself.277
Operationally, incorporative statutes can achieve several different goals. For example, an
incorporative statute can translate principles of public international law into terms that are
consistent with a state’s domestic legal regime.278 Alternatively, an incorporative statute can
amend the scope or nature of the principle that is transferred into national law so as to make
various principles more palatable to domestic audiences.279 While these measures could change
the content of the relevant duty so much that a breach of international law occurs,280 it is often
difficult to enforce international norms in cases where voluntary compliance has failed.281
Indeed, there are no known cases where a claim has been brought against a state for a violation
of the New York Convention, nor is there any mechanism built into the Convention to facilitate
such a suit.282
Because incorporative statutes are a form of domestic legislation, their status within a
state’s constitutionally mandated legal order is easily established.283 This is not always the case
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with international law, which may be given no role whatsoever in the domestic regime284 or may
be constitutionally inferior to other sorts of law.285
As useful as incorporative statutes may be, they do not avoid all potential problems.286
Perhaps the most troubling issue arises when judges fail to recognize the international origins of
these types of enactments.287 While it is possible for courts to reach an internationally acceptable
solution without relying directly on international principles of law,288 a lack of appreciation for
the international principles underlying a particular statute increases the likelihood that a breach
of public international law will occur.289
Although it is often difficult to establish the appropriate remedy for a breach of
international law,290 continued misapplication of the law by national courts can have serious
repercussions, particularly in the commercial realm.291 Indeed, the connection between
ineffective participation in the international commercial arbitration regime and reduced trade is
well-established in international legal circles.292 Therefore, states that continually misapply the
New York Convention are not only likely to see lower levels of international trade as foreign
parties decide to forego business with entities located in countries that make recovery on an
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arbitral award inherently risky, but those transactions that do go forward may be subject to a
“litigation premium” to offset the cost and uncertainty associated with recovery on an award.293

2.

Types of incorporative statutes

The ever-increasing relevance of international law to matters of previously exclusive domestic
concern294 has resulted in an exponential increase in the number of incorporative statutes over
the last few decades.295 However, different legal systems use different means of incorporating
international principles into domestic law, as the UNCITRAL survey report shows.296 As a
result, it can be difficult to determine which pieces of legislation are incorporative. Indeed, the
only reliable means of identifying an incorporative statute is by its function.297
Under a functional approach, it is possible to conclude that
an “incorporative statute” is any statute that incorporates language or concepts
derived from an international treaty. On a functional level, this definition
includes any statute (1) that incorporates a treaty by reference, (2) whose text
mirrors or closely tracks the test of a treaty, or (3) is otherwise clearly intended to
give effect to a particular treaty provision.298
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Such statutes can “use[] all or part of the treaty language and incorporate[] it as a statutory matter
into domestic law” or can “paraphrase the treaty language, or ‘clarify’ or elaborate on the treaty
language.”299
This emphasis on functionality is extremely useful because it permits further distinctions
between archetypical forms of “enabling” or “implementing” legislation, on the one hand, and
statutes intended to “facilitate the domestic implementation of self-executing treaties,” on the
other.300 Although the two types of enactments may not seem all that different,
including facilitating legislation in the definition [of incorporate statutes] focuses
attention on the question of what it means when a statute, by its terms,
incorporates language or concepts from a document that has a separate existence
on the international plane, even if its ultimate goal is simply to supply procedural
rules for the domestic enforcement of those norms.301
This is an important observation, since it suggests that there may be times when it is
necessary or appropriate to adopt domestic legislation ancillary to a self-executing treaty.
Indeed, international commercial arbitration might constitute an excellent example of this type of
situation, given the brevity of the New York Convention and the need, even in monist legal
systems, to adopt domestic legislation to create various procedural mechanisms to support the
international arbitral regime.302
The next question, of course, is how to determine whether a particular statute is enabling
or facilitative. Because the function of the two types of legislation is directly related to the
question of self-execution, it might initially appear appropriate to consider whether the treaty that
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generated the relevant statute is self-executing or not. However, that inquiry can prove
inconclusive, as illustrated by the case of the New York Convention.303
Furthermore, focusing solely on the status of the treaty would ignore important
information regarding the intent of Congress in adopting the statute in question. While the selfexecution analysis does include an intent element, that inquiry focuses primarily on the
President’s and Senate’s intent in ratifying the treaty.304 It is possible that an analysis of the
incorporative statute could yield a slightly different result, since the entire Congress is involved
in the process of enacting domestic legislation.305 Given that incorporative statutes play an
important and diverse role in dualist regimes as both a practical and policy-based matter,306 it
appears appropriate to consider both the text and the purpose of such legislation when
determining whether that enactment is facilitative or enabling.307
Although a comprehensive examination of the text and drafting history of Chapter 2 of
the FAA is beyond the scope of this Article, it is nevertheless possible to outline some of the
basic issues relevant to this analysis.308 On the one hand, it appears as if Chapter 2 could be
construed as a form of implementing legislation, based on language in Section 201 stating that
“[t]he Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,
1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”309 This
303

See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also supra notes 78-122 and accompanying text.
See Bederman, supra note 133, at 1000; Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1334-35; Jackson, supra note 51,
at 328; Wuerth, supra note 296, at 4, 9; supra note 64 and accompanying text.
305
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 n.12 (2008); Wuerth, supra note 296, at 4, 9.
306
See supra notes 433-82 and accompanying text.
307
No effort is made here to assign the relative weight of each of these constituent elements. However, it
would appear appropriate to conclude that a high degree of certainty regarding the outcome of one
analysis (either statutory construction or treaty interpretation) would diminish the degree of certainty
needed to establish the other element.
308
Further reading is available. See Hulbert, supra note 170, at 53-59 (regarding Chapter 2); Margaret L.
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 99, 101-13 (2006) (regarding Chapter 1).
309
9 U.S.C. §201 (2012); see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-22.
304

56

conclusion is further supported by the fact that when “President Johnson forwarded the New
York Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on American accession, . . . the
President’s message stated that American ratification would be deferred until necessary
implementing legislation had been enacted.”310
On the other hand, it is also possible to conclude that Chapter 2 does not in fact
implement the New York Convention but instead simply “facilitate[s] the domestic
implementation of [a] self-executing treat[y].”311 This interpretation of Chapter 2 may seem
more appropriate, given that “[a] treaty-facilitating statute is one that spells out how a given
provision in a self-executing treaty should be applied by courts called upon to resolve cases and
controversies that turn on this provision.”312 Many of the procedural provisions found in Chapter
2, including those relating to federal jurisdiction, venue, removal, compelling arbitration, naming
of arbitrators and confirmation of the award, appear facilitative, as does the explicit direction to
incorporate Chapter 1 of the FAA (a patently non-incorporative statute focusing entirely on
procedural issues) to the extent possible and necessary.313 Furthermore, this interpretation of
Chapter 2 is not inconsistent with the language of Section 201, which can be read as facilitative
in nature.314
Characterizing Chapter 2 of the FAA as facilitative would also be consistent with
practices found in other jurisdictions.315 For example, France, a well-known monist state, has
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adopted an international commercial arbitration statute that covers many of the same issues as
Chapter 2 of the FAA and achieves many of the same purposes.316 The Model Arbitration Law
serves a similarly facilitative function and makes no effort to operate as a form of implementing
legislation.317 Indeed, the Model Arbitration Law has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions
that do not need to adopt any sort of enabling legislation to give domestic effect to treaties.318
Framing Chapter 2 as a facilitative instrument would also be consistent with the views of
numerous scholars and practitioners who have recognized the need for states to adopt ancillary
legislation to provide a procedural environment in which the New York Convention can
operate.319
Based on the above, it is at least arguable that Chapter 2 of the FAA is facilitative, rather
than enabling.320 However, consistent with Sunstein’s theory of incompletely theorized
agreements, it may not be necessary to reach a definitive conclusion about the nature of Chapter
2.321 Instead, simply framing those provisions as incorporative may yield sufficiently useful
results.322 The following discussion therefore considers the various differences in outcome that
would result if Chapter 2 of the FAA were considered to be an incorporative statute as opposed
to a form of implementing legislation.323 In so doing, it is necessary to consider the interpretive
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approach that would be taken if the New York Convention were considered self-executing, an
issue that is taken up first.324

B.

Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA Under the Vienna
Convention

If the New York Convention is considered self-executing, then it should be interpreted pursuant
to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.325 Numerous works have been written on how
to apply these measures, and it is unnecessary for this Article to delve into those matters too
deeply.326 Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss how this analysis might be conducted under the
New York Convention, since international commercial arbitration presents some unique
challenges and opportunities.327 Interestingly, this approach allows the introduction of some
important information that has not typically been considered by U.S. courts.328
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According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a court must look at “the ordinary
meaning” of the treaty, in its “context and in the light of its object and purpose.”329 Context can
be gleaned from both the text of the treaty as well as “any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and “any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation.”330 Article 32 indicates that the travaux préparatoires may be taken
into account to confirm the interpretation resulting from the analysis under Article 31 or to assist
in cases of ambiguity or absurdity.331 Each of these factors is considered separately.

1.

Purpose

The purpose of the New York Convention is uncontroversial and widely acknowledged by
authorities both inside and outside the United States.332 In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court,
the “principal purpose of the [New York] Convention ‘was to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the
signatory countries.’”333 Furthermore, international commercial arbitration holds a place of
special esteem in the U.S. legal order, since
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the
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parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in
a domestic context.334
As a result, U.S. courts “should be most cautious before interpreting . . . domestic legislation in
such manner as to violate international agreements” such as the New York Convention.335

2.

Context

The second interpretive element to be considered under the Vienna Convention is the context of
the agreement.336 This step includes an analysis of both the text of the treaty to be interpreted as
well as the subsequent agreements and practices of the parties.337

a.

Text

A comprehensive analysis of the text of the New York Convention is beyond the scope of this
Article, although courts construing the Convention in light of a particular dispute will of course
need to focus on the precise language at issue.338 However, for purposes of this discussion it is
sufficient to consider the overall structure of the Convention, which can be in some ways
confusing.339
On the one hand, a number of provisions in the New York Convention explicitly state
that they are to be applied exclusively, suggesting that the treaty is to be applied by states parties
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in a single, uniform manner.340 On the other hand, the Convention also contemplates a
significant role for domestic law.341 There are several issues on which the New York
Convention is entirely silent, thereby creating a gap that only national law can fill.342 Other
matters are specifically made subject to domestic law, again diminishing the expectation that the
Convention creates a single comprehensive and universally applicable international regime.343 In
still other instances, the New York Convention allows the parties to choose whether to rely on
procedures outlined in the Convention or those available under national law.344
The New York Convention therefore demonstrate a mixed system which reserves a
significant amount of discretion to states parties to decide how to address certain matters relating
to international commercial arbitration while nevertheless imposing a single, internationally
applicable standard with respect to other questions of arbitral law and procedure.345 Those
elements that are subject to domestic law by choice or necessity typically cannot lead to a breach
of international law, since the treaty does not establish any internationally enforceable criteria.346
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However, a violation of international law can occur with respect to those aspects of the
New York Convention that must be applied in a single, internationally consistent manner.347 The
most well-known areas of tension involve Article V, which describes the exclusive grounds for
objections to the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award under the Convention,348 and
Article II, which sets forth the necessary form requirements.349 Some of the variations in
approach can clearly be traced to the use of implementing legislation in dualist jurisdictions.350

b.

Subsequent practices of the parties

Part of the contextual analysis under the Vienna Convention involves an evaluation of the
subsequent practices of the parties.351 While this inquiry may be difficult to undertake in some
areas of law as a practical matter, the international arbitral community has spent a considerable
amount of time and effort compiling detailed and reliable data on the way in which the New
York Convention has been construed and applied around the world.352 This information, which
has been gathered for more than fifty years, is published in various yearbooks and electronic
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databases so as to promote international consistency relating to the interpretation and application
of the New York Convention.353
These materials could be viewed in one of two lights. First, these resources could be seen
as reflecting the subsequent practices of the parties to the New York Convention and could be
considered relevant to an analysis of an arbitration agreement or award falling under the
Convention on those grounds.354 This approach is consistent with that taken in U.S. courts, since
the U.S. Supreme Court has itself relied on “‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory
states” when interpreting treaties in other contexts.355 Therefore, U.S. courts can and likely
should consider the materials contained in these yearbooks and databases as relevant to the
interpretation of the New York Convention.356 Indeed, a judge’s guide recently published by the
Federal Judicial Center specifically suggests that courts consider international consensus when
considering matters relating to international commercial arbitration.357
Second, these yearbooks and databases might be viewed as reflecting the customary
international law of international commercial arbitration. Although the international arbitral
community has not discussed the development of customary international law with respect to the
procedural aspects of the New York Convention,358 Ian Brownlie has noted that “collections of
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municipal cases . . . are important in any assessment of the customary law.”359 These decisions
therefore might be admissible in U.S. courts pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention, which can be read as referring to customary international law as well as
international treaties.360
Although this second approach appears viable as a jurisprudential matter, some problems
could arise. For example, as a practical matter, U.S. courts are often more inclined to “consult
convenient codifications or summaries” of customary international law rather than the original
materials.361 While this obstacle could be overcome by recourse to any one of a number of
excellent treatises in this area of law,362 U.S. courts may be somewhat hesitant to rely on
customary international law given its somewhat suspect status in U.S. domestic law.363
Therefore, at this point, parties are probably better off relying on the subsequent practices
provision of the Vienna Convention or on U.S. Supreme Court precedent when presenting this
material in U.S. courts,364 unless and until the Court provides any additional guidance regarding
the role of customary international law in U.S. law.365
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c.

Subsequent agreements of the parties

“Context” in the Vienna Convention also includes any subsequent agreements of the parties.366
Because the Convention requires, rather than merely permits, recourse to the parties’ subsequent
agreements, courts should give significant weight to these authorities.367 However, the term
“agreement” is not defined in the Convention, thus raising questions as to the level of formality
that is needed to constitute an “agreement” under the Convention.368
Commentators have suggested that “[t]he agreement need not be in binding or treaty form
but must demonstrate that the parties intended their understanding to constitute an agreed basis
for interpretation.”369 One item in the area of international commercial arbitration that might
qualify under these criteria is a recommendation promulgated by UNCITRAL regarding the
interpretation and application of Articles II(2) and VII(1) of the New York Convention
(UNCITRAL Recommendation).370 The Recommendation is very brief in its substantive
provisions, stating in relevant part that it “[r]ecommends that article II, paragraph 2, of the [New
York Convention] be applied recognizing that the circumstances described therein are not
exhaustive.”371 Although the UNCITRAL Recommendation is somewhat limited in its scope,
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the document could nevertheless result in a significant change in how form requirements are
interpreted and applied around the world, since the provision not only allows but encourages a
widespread liberalization of the current regime.372
The UNCITRAL Recommendation is part of a recent “explosion in the number of
declarative texts in the field of international law.”373 This kind of “soft law” is often seen as
advantageous because it allows international agreement and implementation to be reached more
quickly and more easily than more formal measures.374 Soft law also encourages incremental
development of the law, which many observers believe to be useful in achieving legitimacy.375
However, soft law’s real advantage may be the way that it provides direct and authoritative
guidance to judges regarding the way in which certain international instruments are to be
construed.376
Commentators have long supported the use of soft law in international commercial
arbitration, since “nonbinding general principles can achieve the goal of uniform or, at least,
harmonized law by providing general principles that can more easily accommodate various legal
traditions.”377 Some of these devices “can serve as evidence of the formation of customary
international law.”378
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At this point it is unclear how U.S. courts will treat the UNCITRAL Recommendation.379
On the one hand, some commentators have noted that “[w]hen interpreting U.S. statutes that
incorporate . . . international law, courts typically refuse to regard informal international
agreements and declarations as sources of law for purposes of construing and applying the
domestic statute.”380 However, UNCITRAL reports and recommendations have proven
persuasive to federal courts in other contexts where Congress has adopted an instrument drafted
by UNCITRAL.381 Furthermore, at least one federal court has looked to a UNCITRAL report to
help construe the provisions of a U.S. state statute based on the Model Arbitration Law.382 These
phenomena suggest that U.S. courts may be amenable to considering the UNCITRAL
Recommendation when construing Article II(2) of the New York Convention.383

3.

Travaux préparatoires

The final factor that may be considered in a Vienna Convention analysis involves the travaux
préparatoires, which may be used to supplement the inquiry conducted under Article 31.384
Although travaux préparatoires can provide a wealth of information regarding the drafting
history of various elements of the New York Convention,385 U.S. courts have seldom referred to
these materials in practice.386 It is unclear whether the failure to refer to the travaux
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préparatoires results from a desire to limit recourse to international legal resources or from a
conclusion that consideration of such materials is unnecessary in a particular instance.

4.

Interim conclusion

As the preceding shows, a full-fledged evaluation of the New York Convention under a Vienna
Convention analysis would open the door to consideration of a number of new materials,
including judicial opinions from other jurisdictions, the UNCITRAL Recommendation and, to a
lesser extent, the travaux préparatoires.387 Although many of these resources are not currently
part of the standard U.S. analysis, the methodological approach outlined in the Vienna
Convention is nevertheless consistent with that reflected in U.S. law and practice, which suggests
that courts can and likely should consider these types of materials going forward.388
One element that is notably missing from the Vienna Convention analysis is any
consideration of the text or purpose of Chapter 2 of the FAA.389 This lack of attention to
domestic legislation is understandable in situations where the underlying treaty is to be given
direct effect within the domestic legal order.390 However, international commercial arbitration is
a field that involves both international treaties and domestic legislation.391 The question
therefore becomes how best to proceed when an international treaty and a domestic statute
address the same or complementary subject matters.
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C.

Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA under the Charming Betsy Canon

Under the analytical framework adopted by U.S. courts, reliance on the Vienna Convention or
similar interpretive methodologies is only appropriate if the New York Convention is determined
to be self-executing.392 If the Convention is not self-executing, then its provisions are not
directly applicable in U.S. courts, although the United States remains bound to the terms of the
Convention as a matter of international law.393 In these situations, courts are required to analyze
the relationship between domestic and international law as a matter of constitutional law.394
One of the most well-known constitutional canons relating to potential conflicts between
international and domestic law is the Charming Betsy canon.395 This longstanding interpretive
device arose out of a case known as Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, which involved a ship
(the Charming Betsy) that was seized by the U.S. Navy on the grounds that the ship was
operating in violation of a domestic statute prohibiting U.S. citizens from trading with France.396
The owner, who claimed that he had previously renounced his U.S. citizenship in favor of
Danish citizenship, took the view that applying the statute to him would violate the law of
nations, particularly those provisions that protected the commercial trading rights of citizens
from neutral states.397
The case resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic edict that ambiguous domestic
statutes “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
392
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construction remains.”398 This principle, which has subsequently been held to apply to situations
involving both self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,399 has been considered by
commentators in a variety of contexts, including international commercial arbitration.400
However, no federal court appears to have relied upon the Charming Betsy when considering the
potential overlap between the New York Convention and the FAA.401
Although this situation is in some ways inexplicable given the confusion about the
relationship between and interpretation of the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA,
it may be that the conventional reading of the Charming Betsy, which is somewhat narrow, does
not appear relevant to matters relating to international commercial arbitration.402 However, some
commentators believe that the canon has expanded beyond its traditional boundaries and now
offers three additional applications.403 Some of these principles may find traction in cases
involving international commercial arbitration.

398

Id. at 118; Coyle, supra note 3, at 699; Hathaway et al., supra note 6, at 89.
See Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 196 (D. Mass. 2004); Rebecca Crootof, Note, Judicious
Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L.J. 1784, 1804-05
(2011).
400
However, in most instances the references to the Charming Betsy canon are somewhat cursory. See
Alford, Deference, supra note 224, at 700-04, 731-35; Park & Yanos, supra note 212, at 253; Rich, supra
note 74, at 127-27, 133.
401
See Goss, supra note 8, at 93; see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir.
2012) (citing, but not relying upon, the Charming Betsy). However, the government did cite the
Charming Betsy canon in its papers supporting a denial of certiorari in Safety National, as did the
respondents. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self
Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010) (No. 09-945), 2010 WL
3375626, at *13; Brief of Respondents Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, La. Safety, 131 S. Ct. at
65 (No. 09-945), 2010 WL 1453142, at *31; see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety, 131 S. Ct. at 65; Goss,
supra note 8, at 93.
402
See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012); see also supra notes 79-122, 20106 and accompanying text. However, the problem may also be that the Charming Betsy is more often
cited by commentators than by courts. See Alford, Internationalization, supra note 7, at 147; Stephan,
supra note 7, at 1646-47.
403
See Coyle, supra note 3, at 699-714; Crootof, supra note 399, at 1810.
399

71

First, commentators suggest that the Charming Betsy could be interpreted as establishing
a presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute.404 This reading of the canon acts as
a type of “‘braking mechanism’ intended to ‘restrain the scope of federal enactments’”405 and
could prove useful in cases where parties seek to apply the FAA extraterritorially in
contravention to the law and practice of international commercial arbitration.406
One place where this principle might be relevant is in disputes involving Section 206 of
the FAA.407 That provision indicates that U.S. courts may compel arbitration at “any place . . .
provided for” in the arbitration agreement, “whether that place is within or without the United
States.”408 While this provision encourages robust enforcement of arbitration agreements and
may therefore appear to comply with the pro-arbitration principles of the New York Convention,
the arbitral community is split as to whether a court has the power to compel arbitration
extraterritorially.409
Because the Charming Betsy only applies in cases of statutory ambiguity, it could be
difficult to apply the canon to cases involving motions to compel arbitration, since this aspect of
Section 206 is not ambiguous.410 However, the second portion of Section 206 does seem to
reflect the necessary degree of ambiguity, since that provision indicates that U.S. courts “may
also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement” but does not state
404
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whether that power is limited to arbitrations seated within the United States.411 Commentators
have universally denounced the extraterritorial appointment of arbitral tribunals, which suggests
that the Charming Betsy canon could prove useful in limiting this sort of questionable
behavior.412
Other U.S. practices could also benefit from an extraterritorial braking device. For
example, the international arbitral community is strongly divided about the propriety of foreign
anti-suit injunctions413 and discovery under 28 U.S.C. §1782,414 and the Charming Betsy canon
could provide a principled means of limiting one or the other of those devices.415
The second variation on the Charming Betsy requires courts to “endeavor to construe”
any statute and treaty that “relate to the same subject” in a manner that would “give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either.”416 This principle has been
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described as “the canon against implied repeal” and works to avoid unnecessary application of
the last-in-time rule.417
Interestingly, this interpretation of the Charming Betsy could prove somewhat difficult to
apply in international commercial arbitration.418 Indeed, experience suggests that a number of
problems can arise when courts attempt to harmonize domestic and international law in the area
of arbitration, resulting in potential breaches of the New York Convention.419
For example, importation of the concept of manifest disregard of law from domestic law
into disputes governed by the New York Convention has generated a considerable amount of
controversy and arguably constitutes a breach of the United States’ treaty obligations under the
Convention.420 Other difficulties arise when U.S. courts attempt to combine the form
requirements of the New York Convention with those reflected in Chapter 2 of the FAA.421 Not
only is it possible that this practice impermissibly alters the standards used to identify when an
arbitration agreement or award falls under the Convention, but the various circuit splits that exist
within the United States in this area of law violate the New York Convention’s overarching goal
of promoting predictability in matters relating to international arbitration.422 Therefore, this
second variation on the Charming Betsy canon does not appear beneficial in cases involving
international commercial arbitration.423
The third and final way of expanding the Charming Betsy canon involves reading the
case as standing “for the proposition that Congress generally intends that ambiguous statutes –
417
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including statutes that are not by their nature incorporative – be read to conform to international
norms.”424 Under this approach, the Charming Betsy would act as “an ‘engine’ that seeks to
‘conform U.S. law to the aspirations of international law.’”425
While some courts and commentators would doubtless applaud this reading of the
Charming Betsy canon,426 others would disagree.427 The biggest concern about this particular
proposal involves its breadth. Not only would this interpretation of the Charming Betsy apply to
incorporative statutes that have a direct and logical link to international law, it would also apply
to non-incorporative statutes that have no obvious connection to international legal principles.428
Furthermore, this interpretive technique relies on international customary law to the same extent
as international treaties, which can lead to a number of practical and jurisprudential problems.429
However, the most notable concern involving this third variation on the Charming Betsy
is that it triggers the potentially irreconcilable policy debate between nationalists and
transnationalists about the role that international law should play in modern society.430 Since it is
both unwise and unnecessary to adopt an interpretive canon that generates as many problems as
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it solves, this third approach seems ill-conceived, at least in the context of international
commercial arbitration.
The various iterations of the Charming Betsy canon therefore appear largely unhelpful to
international commercial arbitration, either because of a lack of relevance (the traditional
reading) or inapposite results (the second and third variations).431 While the first variation on the
conventional interpretation of the canon (i.e., the prohibition on extraterritorial application) could
prove useful in certain limited circumstances,432 there may be other interpretive devices that
provide assistance on a broader range of issues.

D.

Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA Under the Borrowed Treaty Rule
1.

Applying the borrowed treaty rule in theory

Although the third variation on the Charming Betsy canon proved problematic because of its
excessive breadth, the proposal’s aim (i.e., increased integration of international and domestic
law) has been supported by commentators who believe that the recent expansion of international
law that has occurred as a result of globalization requires a new understanding of how
international legal principles affect national law.433 One way of obtaining the benefits of that
approach while minimizing the concerns enunciated by those adopting more of a nationalist
perspective could be through adoption of the borrowed treaty rule, which is an interpretive
technique devised by John Coyle.434 This rule, which could be applied in both the United States
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and in other jurisdictions, would “facilitate[] the consistent interpretation of texts across multiple
jurisdictions, thereby making possible the establishment of truly international standards.”435
Coyle’s moderately internationalist interpretive approach is consistent with techniques
proposed by commentators from other countries and in other fields. For example, Frédéric
Bachand, a Canadian scholar writing from the arbitral perspective, has suggested that “judges
sitting in states that have signalled their willingness to support the international arbitration
system must consider the relevant international normative context while answering questions of
international arbitration law to which local sources offer no obvious answer.”436 Bachand’s
thesis is that “domestic courts can and should recognize the existence of this body of
transnational rules, but also – in some circumstances – that these rules have constraining effects
in [the courts’] domestic legal orders, and thus on their decisionmaking process.”437 Specialists
in transnational litigation have also suggested a greater reliance on international and foreign legal
principles.438
Interestingly, the borrowed treaty rule is not only consistent with the methodology used
by several courts in international disputes,439 it is also similar to certain techniques used within
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the domestic U.S. legal order.440 The closest of these interpretive analogues is the “borrowed
statute rule,” which indicates that states that have adopted (or “borrowed”) a statute from another
jurisdiction are typically deemed to have also adopted the original jurisdiction’s interpretation of
that statute.441 However, the borrowed treaty rule also resembles other domestic devices,
including reception statutes442 and law-finding techniques used by federal courts sitting in
diversity cases. 443
The borrowed treaty rule also resembles interpretive methods used in cases involving
self-executing treaties.444 These similarities result from the recognition that there is little, if any,
difference between a self-executing treaty and a statute that incorporates a treaty by reference,
either in whole or in part.445 However,
[t]his does not . . . mean that courts should read a directly incorporative statute as
though it were itself a treaty. Rather, it means that when a court is called upon to
interpret a statute that copies language from a treaty, that court should seek,
whenever possible, to conform its interpretation of that language to its reading of
the incorporated treaty.446
Furthermore, because the borrowed treaty rule “makes it unnecessary to go down the
treacherous path of reading incorporative statutes as though they themselves were
treaties,” the rule “preserv[es] a clear line between statutes and treaties and, perhaps more
440
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importantly, between canons of treaty interpretation and canons of statutory
interpretation.447
This approach can be justified on a number of policy grounds.448 For example,
reading an incorporative statute in a manner that is consistent with its underlying treaty
can result in enhanced effectiveness of the international legal regime, a decrease in
intentional or unintentional failure to implement the relevant norms, increased assurances
that all states parties will comply with their obligations and an increased ability for
individuals to rely on international law.449
Furthermore, many of the policy arguments against allowing direct domestic
effect of international treaties do not apply to the borrowed treaty rule.450 For example,
direct application of treaties eliminates the ability of Congress to “reword the treaty to
match domestic circumstances,” “elaborate on the treaty provisions, which [Congress]
may view as ambiguous” and “delay application [of the treaty] to allow internal
consensus and acceptance to develop.”451 However, the borrowed treaty rule respects the
ability of Congress to limit domestic application of certain aspects of the treaty or alter its
meaning in some manner.452 If such intentions are clear, they will be upheld under this
particular interpretive canon.453
The borrowed treaty rule also addresses the “difficult constitutional question”
relating to the role (if any) that a non-self-executing but implemented treaty has in the
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U.S. legal system.454 For example, under the borrowed treaty rule, a “[c]ourt’s
interpretation of an incorporative statute should always be consistent with its
interpretation of the source treaty text unless there is compelling evidence that Congress,
in enacting the statute, intended to deviate from the rule set forth in the treaty.”455 The
process requires the court to “pivot away from the domestic text (a statute duly enacted
by Congress), to the international text (a treaty duly ratified by the United States), and . . .
confirm that the court’s construction of the former is consistent with its interpretation of
the latter.”456 Although this process gives a considerable amount of weight to
internationalist concerns, it is also guided, and ultimately controlled, by domestic
principles of law.
When applying the borrowed treaty rule, courts must interpret the underlying
treaty in a manner consistent with the Vienna Convention or national law.457 However,
the interpretation of the underlying treaty is not made directly applicable within the
United States, as would occur in cases involving a self-executing treaty.458 Instead, the
interpretation of the treaty forms a baseline for comparison with the interpretation of the
incorporative statute. The borrowed treaty rule indicates that those two analyses should
arrive at the same outcome, absent Congressional intention to the contrary.459
This result is considered appropriate because

Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732-33 (5th Cir.
2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety
Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010);
see also U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
455
Coyle, supra note 3, at 669-70.
456
Id.
457
See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, arts. 31-32; Coyle, supra note 3, at 687; see also supra notes
124-36 and accompanying text.
458
See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
459
See Coyle, supra note 3, at 680.
454

80

[t]he basic purpose of an incorporative statute is to incorporate into . . . [domestic
law] a set of rules that are consistent with an internationally agreed upon standard
set forth in a treaty. . . . International treaties first establish these international
standards and, thereafter, those states that choose to ratify the treaties incorporate
them into their own statutory law.460
Thus, the borrowed treaty rule “is entirely consistent with the institutional role of courts
in the [U.S.] constitutional structure,” since the rule expressly contemplates the fact that
whenever “the legislative and the executive branches, acting together, choose to enact legislation
that incorporates the terms of a treaty, they are making a decision to conform domestic law to
international law.”461 Indeed, if the courts were “to interpret an incorporative statute in a way
that differs materially from the way they would interpret the relevant provision in the text of the
source treaty, they would, in effect, be undermining the political branches’ decision to
incorporate a particular international rule into [domestic law].”462

2.

Applying the borrowed treaty rule in international commercial arbitration

Having described how the borrowed treaty rule is applied as a matter of theory, the next question
is how the rule is applied as a practical matter, particularly in cases involving international
commercial arbitration. Fortunately, the process is relatively straightforward.
First, courts review the text of the treaty to which the incorporative statute relates.463 “If
the text of the treaty is clear, then the court should read the incorporative statute to conform to
the borrowed treaty text unless there is compelling evidence that Congress intended a different
result.”464 This is a relatively easy task in international commercial arbitration, given the brevity
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and clarity of the New York Convention.465 Furthermore, this approach eliminates the
possibility that a court might inadvertently adopt a course of action that is contrary to the express
language of the Convention.466
However, “if there is any ambiguity in the text of the treaty, the court should, as
necessary, resort to those special canons of construction that have customarily been used to
resolve such ambiguities in treaties.”467 Though the New York Convention is relatively
unambiguous, one potential area of concern involves the form requirement under Article II.468
Under the borrowed treaty rule, those matters would be considered pursuant to the interpretive
techniques described in the Vienna Convention or national law,469 which would empower courts
to consult the same kinds of resources (such as international consensus relating to the states
parties’ subsequent practices and the UNCITRAL Recommendation) that would be available if
the New York Convention were considered a self-executing treaty.470
“Once the ambiguity has been resolved, the court should read the incorporative statute to
conform to the borrowed treaty, . . . unless there is compelling evidence that Congress intended a
different result.”471 This step sets the borrowed treaty rule apart from an interpretative
methodology based solely on the Vienna Convention, since the borrowed treaty rule expressly
directs courts to consider the text and intent of incorporative statutes such as Chapter 2 of the
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FAA.472 This approach should give some comfort to proponents of a nationalist approach to
international law, since domestic law is allowed to play an important role in the interpretation
process.473 However, the rule also includes a rebuttable presumption that Congress intended to
adopt a statute that was consistent with the text and purpose of the underlying treaty.474 This
second attribute should win the support of those who take an internationalist approach to law,
since this technique decreases the likelihood that the United States will breach its international
obligations in situations where domestic and international law cover the same subject matter.475
The borrowed treaty rule can also be contrasted to the Charming Betsy canon.476
Because “[t]he borrowed treaty rule [is] used to read incorporative statutes even where there is
no obvious conflict between the statute and the treaty, and, most importantly, even where the text
of the statute at issue is not on its face ambiguous,” the rule is somewhat broader than the
Charming Betsy canon, which is limited to cases of legislative ambiguity.477 However, the
outcome under the borrowed treaty rule is in many ways analogous to that which arises under the
Charming Betsy canon, since both techniques insure that the interpretation of the domestic
statute “is consistent with the rule of international law being incorporated.”478 In other ways, the
two methodologies are quite distinct, since the borrowed treaty rule engages directly with “the
core function of the incorporative statute, that is, to incorporate an internationally agreed upon
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legal standard into the national law of the United States,” while the Charming Betsy canon does
not.479
The borrowed treaty rule also provides a welcome degree of flexibility, since “[t]he
strength of the rule may vary . . . depending on how closely the text of the incorporative statute
tracks the language in the relevant treaty.”480 If there are “substantial” differences between the
treaty and the statute, then the justification for “conforming one’s reading of the statute to the
treaty are correspondingly less compelling, even if the underlying aim of the statute is to
incorporate the terms of the treaty.”481 In this latter category of cases, the legislature has
obviously contemplated important differences between the international understanding and
domestic application, and the domestic rule will govern in national courts as a matter of
constitutional law, even though the international obligation continues at a state-to-state level.482
Notably, international commercial arbitration does not appear to suffer from this kind of
problem, since the New York Convention and the FAA are consistent (or complementary) in
most regards.483

4.

Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA Under a Teleological
Approach

The final interpretive technique to consider involves a teleological approach to “domestic
provisions adopted with a view to giving effect domestically to” the New York Convention.484
Although this methodology is aimed specifically at international commercial arbitration, it is
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built on the recognition that “teleological interpretation has traditionally played a part in the
interpretation of multilateral, ‘legislative’ conventions.”485
Under a teleological approach, courts should “determine whether there is consensus on
the answer to the question at hand – not generally among all countries which lend their support
to the international arbitration system, but rather among jurisdictions in which the provisions at
issue are also in effect.”486 If a single internationally acceptable norm can be identified, then that
standard should be used by the court.487
The situation is slightly more difficult if a single norm cannot be identified, even after an
appropriately comparative analysis has been completed.488 However, if the instrument to be
construed is the New York Convention, then the court may turn to the interpretive techniques
outlined in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention to determine what standard should
apply.489 Because the New York Convention is intended “to unify certain areas of the law,”
courts must “refrain from assuming that . . . terms” used in the Convention “unquestionably”
have the same meaning that they do in domestic legislation.490 Furthermore,
consideration should be given to the practice of states parties to the treaty (which
practice includes decisions rendered by their courts, as well as statutes giving an
indication of their understanding of the meaning and effect of the treaty’s
provision) which reveal an agreement regarding its interpretation.491
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Recourse also can and should be had to the travaux préparatoires, although these documents
play “a less important role than the factors just alluded to.”492
Although the teleological approach bears certain similarities to techniques adopted under
both the Vienna Convention and the borrowed treaty rule, the emphasis on international
consensus appears to be unique to this particular interpretive mode.493 Focusing on whether a
particular state has “signalled [its] willingness to support the international arbitration system”
provides a useful normative context, since it avoids interpreting the New York Convention and
the relevant incorporative statutes in a vacuum and instead concentrates on the purpose of the
treaty.494 The teleological approach also avoids problems of over-breadth by limiting itself to
“questions of international arbitration law to which local sources offer no obvious answer.”495
Although this is somewhat similar to the way in which the Charming Betsy canon limits itself to
ambiguous statutes, the teleological approach addresses a different subset of problems and is
somewhat more comprehensive in that it also takes the possibility of conflicting case law (a
significant problem in the United States) into account.496
However, the teleological approach also suffers from some potential problems. The
biggest concern may be its somewhat free-floating nature. U.S. courts appreciate hard and fast
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rules, even (or particularly) in areas involving constitutional and international law, and the
teleological approach may not provide the necessary degree of methodological specificity.497
A second issue involves the propriety of a teleological approach as a matter of U.S. law.
Although purposive interpretation does have a place in U.S. law, such practices are not currently
in favor, given the contemporary preference for textualism.498 As a result, it appears unlikely
that U.S. courts would adopt an interpretive theory that explicitly relies on teleological methods.

V.

Conclusion

Although specialists in the field have long been aware of the many complexities that can arise in
cases involving international commercial arbitration, courts and commentators in other areas of
law are only now being introduced to the diverse and difficult issues that can and do arise in
disputes involving the New York Convention and the FAA.499 While a number of public and
private entities are taking steps to help courts, commentators, arbitrators and advocates
understand the nuances of the U.S. law of international commercial arbitration,500 these efforts
are in many ways too little and too late. Several significant circuit splits involving international
commercial arbitration already exist, with more appearing likely to arise in the coming years.501
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Most analysts consider these lines of cases in light of their various factual similarities.502
Though helpful in some regards, those kinds of narrow, subject-specific analyses overlook a
number of important commonalities that arise as a matter of constitutional and public
international law. Focusing on these broader issues, as this Article has done, not only provides
the U.S. judiciary with an opportunity to establish a standard interpretive method that cuts across
all aspects of international commercial arbitration, thereby avoiding the practical and
jurisprudential problems associated with a more fragmented approach,503 it also increases the
likelihood that courts will render decisions that comply with the United States’ international
obligations under the New York Convention.504
One of the primary means by which these ends are achieved involves characterizing
Chapter 2 of the FAA not as implementing legislation per se but as an incorporative statute that
can be either facilitative or enabling in nature. This technique is particularly useful because it
avoids difficult questions relating to whether the New York Convention is self-executing.505
While this approach might be intellectually unfulfilling to those people who prefer a more direct,
black-or-white analysis, Cass Sunstein has emphasized the benefits of incompletely theorized
agreements in the area of constitutional law, and such agreements may also be usefully adopted
with respect to matters relating to the interpretation of treaties like the New York Convention.506
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Framing Chapter 2 of the FAA as incorporative also puts an entirely new spin on the
relationship between the New York Convention and domestic law and allows U.S. courts to
adopt a new and potentially more accurate means of interpreting and applying the relevant legal
provisions.507 Several alternative methodologies have been discussed herein, including various
iterations of the Charming Betsy canon as well as the borrowed treaty rule and a subject-specific
teleological approach.508 Although each interpretive technique has its benefits, the borrowed
treaty rule appears to achieve the best and most appropriate results as a matter of constitutional
and international law. Not only does the borrowed treaty rule take into account the purpose and
nature of incorporative statutes, it also appears to balance the concerns of nationalists and
nationalists in a principled and constitutionally valid manner.
Furthermore, the borrowed treaty rule resonates comfortably with the core values of
international commercial arbitration, even though the rule was developed in the context of U.S.
constitutional law. This consistency of aim is vitally important, given the sophistication and
maturity of contemporary arbitral practice around the world and the special status accorded to
international commercial arbitration by U.S. courts.509 International commercial arbitration has
achieved a level of legitimacy to which other disciplines can only aspire,510 and any interpretive
theory that does not take these well-established practices and principles into account cannot hold
weight.
Although this Article has focused primarily on matters relating to international
commercial arbitration, the insights and conclusions provided herein may be equally useful to
scholars and practitioners specializing in other fields. International commercial arbitration
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provides a wealth of empirical and comparative data about how international treaties are
interpreted and applied around the world, which means that theories about arbitration are rooted
in longstanding and widespread practical experience. As a result, models developed in
international commercial arbitration can provide valuable lessons to courts and commentators
working in other areas of law.
It is, of course, possible to carry an analogy too far, and it may very well be that the
economic underpinnings of international commercial arbitration provide states, courts and parties
with certain incentives or justifications that do not exist in other contexts.511 However, the
widespread success of the New York Convention and the international arbitral regime suggests
that this is a field that is eminently worthy of study.512
As comprehensive as this Article has tried to be, there is much work left to be done as a
matter of both constitutional and public international law. Hopefully, this discussion will act as
an inspiration for further developments, initiatives and research by both public and private
bodies, for only by understanding the complex interaction of constitutional and public
international law can U.S. courts appreciate and appropriately address the various challenges that
currently exist in international commercial arbitration.
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